

AMERICAN POLICY

THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
IN ITS RELATION TO THE EASTERN

JOHN BIGELOW

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
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THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
IN ITS RELATION TO THE EASTERN

BY

JOHN BIGELOW

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PREFACE

THE subjects of Foreign Policy and World Peace have never been so much in the minds and mouths of the people of the United States as at the present day. Pan American Congresses, the Panama Canal, the difference with Japan, the revolution in Mexico, the question of the Philippines, tariff reduction, The Hague Conferences, the Centennial of Peace with Great Britain, and other incidents, direct our thoughts to foreign countries and lead us to reflect on the relations which we hold to them. The purpose of this little work is to minister with fact and reason to such reflection.

It deals with American policies in their broadest aspects, with political problems of the United States and of all America. It seeks to explain the Monroe Doctrine, distinguishing between the extension and the perversion of it; to show its bearing and that of Washington's

Farewell Address upon present national affairs; and to expound the theory of Pan Americanism in its true relation to the Monroe Doctrine.

As used in its pages, the word America means the independent countries of North, South, and Central America. Where the United States alone is referred to it is done in express terms.

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AMERICAN POLICY

I

POPULATION AND GOVERNMENT

“In America, to govern is to populate.”¹ In the last analysis the stability of every government results, as in the United States, in England, in France, in Germany, from the solution of this problem of population; and the instability of government results, as in certain countries of Latin-America and in China, from its non-solution. The most serious troubles of the British Empire to-day are questions of population. The happy solution of the problem by the United States is due principally to the rapidity with which its immigration has been assimilated, which is traceable to its form of government.

One of the grievances which led to the American Revolution was the royal opposition to emigration to the colonies. Throughout the first

¹ Alberdi. Quoted from *Latin America: Its Rise and Progress*, by F. Garcia-Caldéron, p. 339.

half of the nineteenth century Great Britain strove by a variety of legislation to check the tide of emigration to the United States. Not until 1870 did she recognize or grant the right of her subjects to renounce their British allegiance.¹

The nations of America were originally settled with three varieties of people: the Anglo-Saxon, the Portuguese, and the Spanish. The descendants of the latter two are now designated as Latin-Americans. This designation is unnecessarily broad; to be precise, it should be Iberian-Americans.² Out of respect for custom and brevity, I retain the older, simpler term, Latin-American. The Anglo-Saxon and the Portuguese elements are embodied each in a single nation, the former in the United States, the latter in Brazil; but the Spanish element is dispersed among nineteen separate commonwealths, distracted internally by racial as well as political differences.

These two groups, Anglo-Saxon and Latin, developed separately—so much so that for a long

¹ *Die Neueste Einwanderung in den Vereinigten Staaten*, by R. M. Jovanovich, p. 27.

² *Cuestiones Americanas*, by J. S. Carranza, 1907, p. 92.

time they hardly knew each other, except through European literature. It was principally through English literature that the United States knew the Latin states and through French literature that the latter understood the United States. Each group was more identified with Europe than it was with the other, for it was from her that it received the elements of culture and of life that were necessary to it.¹

The Anglo-Saxon element became diluted by immigration, with a variety of foreign blood. In the United States the white population that has descended from non-United States peoples is about evenly divided between a British strain and other non-United States strains. The figures in 1900 were about as follows:

British.....	34,300,000
Other non-United States.....	32,690,000
Total.....	66,990,000

A contingent of 9,313,390 colored people brought the total population to 76,303,390.² It has, however, been remarked that the influential class formed by the higher officers of the

¹ *Le Droit International Américain*, by Alejandro Alvarez, p. 42.

² These figures are based upon the results of exhaustive study and calculation by Professor A. B. Faust, of Cornell University, published in his work, *The German Element in the United States*, II, 27, and the Census of the United States for 1900.

government, of the army and navy, and the leaders in education, are still predominantly of British descent.

In Spanish America, French ideas, in Portuguese America (Brazil), German ideas, prevail.¹ The present population of these two regions, or of Latin-America, is formed, for the greater part, of three races, the Iberian, the Indian, and the African. Certain mixtures of these have their separate designations. Iberian (or other white) and African is called mulatto; Iberian (or other white) and Indian is called mestizo; Indian and African is called Sambo; pure descendants from Iberians (or French) are called Creoles. The Indian element is purer than in the United States and numbers about five and a half million.²

. . . though several tribes of the coast disagree with those of the Sierra, they stand united against the foreign invader and not at all friendly but in the bottom of their hearts still hostile and hoping secretly some day to overthrow the rule of the foreigner.

In Peru, in Bolivia, and in Ecuador, the pure-blooded Indian is the fundamental stock. In

¹ Garcia-Caldéron, *opus cit.*, p. 251.

² *Süd-Amerika und die deutschen Interessen*, by Wilhelm Sievers, 1903.

Peru and in Ecuador the population is about fifty per cent Indian.¹ In the former it is only about twelve and in the latter about seven per cent white.²

Juarez, who was President of Mexico while Maximilian pretended to be Emperor, was a full-blooded Indian.

In the countries in which the pure-blooded Indians have not been able to maintain themselves the mestizos abound. They form the population of Colombia, of Chili, of Uruguay, and of Paraguay, about ninety per cent of the population of Venezuela, and about fifty per cent of that of all South America.³ It is this stock that produced Porfirio Diaz, of Mexico. An Argentine anthropologist says that the mestizo of first crossing is inferior to his European progenitor, but is often superior to his native parent. He assimilates the morality of a superior civilization and predominates at the bar and in politics. He is not, however, a factor in the political and economical unification of America.

¹ Sievers, *opus cit.*

² According to Garcia-Caldéron, the population of Peru and of Ecuador is seventy per cent Indian and only six per cent white, and that of Bolivia fifty per cent Indian, *opus cit.*, p. 332.

³ Sievers, *opus cit.*, pp. 10, 15.

He retains too many of the faults of the native; he is deceitful and servile and often indolent. It is only after new admixtures of European blood that he shows well-developed characteristics acquired from the white race. He is extremely patriotic; Americanism, the spirit of opposition to foreigners, is his creation. He wants to rise and possess himself of the privileges of the Creole oligarchy.¹

Not only do the native whites, blacks, and mestizos form separate strata or castes of society, but the foreign elements of various nationalities stand also more or less apart from the native population, not entering into its political and social life and being absorbed by it, as it is in the United States. This is due partly to indifference on the part of the foreigner and partly to exclusiveness on the part of the native. There are settlements of Germans which preserve their language and national traits and feelings with remarkable persistency, communities that have kept their mother tongue a hundred years, their sons and daughters going to Germany for education.²

¹ Garcia-Caldéron, *opus cit.*, pp. 332, 333.

² *Welche Aussichten bieten sich den Deutschen in Süd-Amerika*, by Doctor Backhaus, p. 4.

While the Indian population is more numerous, the negro population is less so than in the United States. If any countries in South America may be considered as white, they are South Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentine. Alvarez gives the white population of Latin-America as about 10,000,000 out of a total of about 60,000,000.¹

The population of America, including Canada, has about the same density as that of Africa; it is from one-quarter to one-third as dense as that of the non-American world; about one-tenth as dense as that of Europe; from one-fifth to one-fourth as dense as that of Asia; and from five to six times as dense as that of Australia and Oceanica. The population of Latin-America is about seven-tenths as dense as that of the rest of America, including Canada; nearly five times as dense as that of Australia and Oceanica; about one-half as dense as that of the United States;

¹ From figures given in A. Hartleben's *Kleines statistisches Taschenbuch über alle Länder der Erde* (1913), I compute the population of the twenty independent republics of Latin-America as 79,863,336 and the white population as over 12,000,000.

But to quote from another authority: "The population of these twenty republics, from the best obtainable sources of information, . . . amounts to about 73,666,000."—(*Bulletin of Pan-American Union*, February, 1913, p. 225.)

about four-fifths as dense as that of Africa; about one-sixth as dense as that of Asia; and about one-twelfth as dense as that of Europe.¹ This brings us to the great question which all Americans, North and South, should join in helping one another to answer, the mystery of Pan America: Why is it that Latin-America, with its greater extent of territory, and at least equality with the United States in point of soil and climate, is behind the United States in population and resources?² Difference of race, it has been said; difference of political conditions, say others, under which the two regions were settled and developed. The true answer is probably a combination of both of these; for the race is responsible for the government, and the government, by its influence upon immigration and its regulation of it, is more or less responsible for the race. The two must work together for their common good, if either is to be materially improved.

Mr. Ugarte, with admirable frankness, gives his readers a graphic description of the unat-

¹ Computed from A. Hartleben, *opus cit.*

² Latin-America is so sparsely populated that it may be called a desert (Garcia-Caldéron, *opus cit.*, p. 309).

tractive features of Latin-American republicanism. To quote from this portion of his work (1910):

What first strikes one in the New World is the contradiction between the loftiness of the constitutions and the baseness of the political life. The right to vote, which is the foundation of our social contract, proves almost always a delusion, because governments or parties substitute their wishes for the will of the people by means of fraud or revolution. . . . X and Z declaim in resounding periods terminating in "liberty," "progress," or "constitution," and we take sides with one or the other, for no apparent reason, as we choose head or tail in a game of chance. . . . In South America the time has not yet come when ambitions are supported by doctrines. The contest is brutal and plain among those who want to occupy the highest post. And as in a proud people, among whom the greatest insult that can be inflicted on a citizen is to call him "adulador,"¹ those who aspire to rise independently are many, the fact may be accounted for that civil war has been until recently a national function.²

¹ Flatterer, satellite, henchman.

² *El Porvenir de la América Latina*, pp. 205, 220. During the seventy-three years between 1825 and 1898 Bolivia had more than sixty revolutions, a number of international wars, and six presidents assassinated, without counting those who died in exile. *Pueblo enfermo*, by Alcides Arguedas.

The Indians and the mestizos, dispossessed by the conquest or condemned to inferiority, find themselves in the new population as in a foreign country.

Politicians use the combativeness of these masses, corrupting them with a life of adventure and combat, and leading them to find happiness in individual license. In the populous capitals it is not hard to put the suffrage into practice. But in the towns of the interior and in the little villages, where huddle the common people of America, it appears for the present to be an impossibility. . . . Up to this time to cheat the Treasury has been a venial offence. . . . "I attend only to what concerns me," says the majority; "let others attend to the general welfare." And, as every one says the same thing, the result is that no one thinks of what in the last analysis should be every one's business.¹

¹ To the same effect writes Garcia-Caldéron (1911):

"Autocrat-presidents take the place of viceroys. . . . The dominant caste, inheriting the prejudices of the Spaniards, despise industry and commerce, live on politics and its futile agitations. The landed noblemen domineer as they did before the Revolution. There are still the old *latifundia*, extensive domains, which account for the power of the oligarchies. The legislative assemblies act a minor part. . . . Catholicism is still the pivot of social life. These 'pícaros' of the Spanish novel, haughty and ingenious parasites, thrive. Bureaucracy swallows up the wealth of the Treasury; it was formed a century ago of rapacious Castilians, it is made up to-day of shiftless Americans. In spite of the equality proclaimed by the constitutions, the Indian is subjected to the pitiless tyranny of the local authorities, the priest, the justice of the peace, the 'cacique.' Under new names, the petty despots of Spanish times are still in power."

No North American or other foreigner has exposed the defects of Latin-American character and institutions more faithfully and clearly than has Alcides Arguedas in his *Pueblo enfermo, Contribución á la Psicología de los Pueblos hispano-americanos*.¹

Before knowledge cometh humility; the first step in improvement is a true apprehension of one's faults. The remarkable freedom and severity of such self-criticism is full of promise for the future of Latin-America. The foregoing quotations refer to Latin-America in general. They do not apply to every Latin-American country; notably not to the trio called the A B C: Argentina, Brazil, and Chili, which may be made a quartet by the addition of Uruguay. These four nations, says Garcia-Caldéron, will within a century be perfectly organized republics. But a century seems a long time to wait for that consummation.

Both of the forementioned writers favor

¹ With respect to reform he says:

"... the great problem, almost the only one, is to modify those three elements which fatally co-operate to oppose the development of the country for a long time to come: the excessive immorality and lack of training of the governing classes, the thorough corruption of the classes governed, and the nullity of the indigenous, the numerically preponderant race."—(P. 428.)

oligarchic, absolute government for Latin-America; but Mr. Ugarte, being a socialist, hopes for eventual popular government. He makes a number of judicious recommendations, but fails to suggest that Latin-American people go to the land of the dreaded "Yanquis" and learn from them the secrets of their success in government and in business, and by association with them acquire some of that energy and aptitude which makes them formidable competitors in so many fields of human endeavor. But without his encouragement or approval Latin-Americans are adopting that sensible course in large and increasing number. Between the years 1900 and 1910 the number of people in the United States born in Latin-America increased from 137,458 to 279,514, or one hundred and three per cent. The increase, in the same period, of those born in other foreign countries was thirty-nine per cent¹ and of the total population twenty-one per cent.² The number of Latin-Americans in Europe in 1910 may be safely reckoned as less than 30,000; say 28,000, about one-tenth as many as in the United States.³

¹ Census (1910), I, 789.

² *Ibid.*, I, 24.

³ Such statistics as I have been able to gather on this point are given in Appendix A.

The number of Latin-American students in the United States has been the subject of some loose talk. *The Outlook*¹ is responsible for the statement, for which it cites no authority, that in 1913 there were 1,500 Latin-Americans studying in the United States. *The Bulletin of the International Bureau of the American Republics*² came out several years ago with this remarkable assertion:

No statistics have been compiled of Latin-American students in the universities, colleges, technical schools, and industrial establishments of the United States, but it is known that there are several thousand of them.

The figures in both cases are estimates. Those yielded by statistical compilation, as carried out by the author, are 1,042.³

It would be interesting in this connection to note the number of Latin-American students in European countries. Unfortunately, it has never been compiled. They are, for certain countries, as follows: for France one hundred and forty-one; for Sweden one; for Denmark one;

¹ August 9, 1913, p. 783.

² Vol. 25, pp. 72, 73 (1909).

³ Based on figures for years 1910-12, furnished by the Bureau of Education. The number includes 231 from Porto Rico.

for Greece none; for Germany about twenty-six¹; for Belgium about one hundred and twenty-nine.² With regard to Spain, I am informed by our ambassador that there are no statistics available. "As an illustration, however, it appears from observation of the students in the Central University of Madrid, who number more than six thousand five hundred, that only a few come from the Americas."³ The number for Russia is reported as "practically negligible."⁴ Allowing ten for Spain and Russia, the total for these seven countries is about three hundred and eight. It is not likely that the rest of Europe contains more than three times this number. It may be concluded that there are more Latin-American students in the United States than there are in Europe.

Mr. Ugarte cautions Latin-Americans against allowing American capital and enterprise to come in any considerable quantity into their country. He pleads impressively for an in-

¹ Computed for the second term of 1913 from figures furnished by the Amerika-Institut of Berlin.

² School year 1912-13. At universities about 125 (letter from Minister of Sciences and Arts to American Minister); at technical schools of college grade, reported 2, estimated 2.

³ Letter from Ambassador J. W. Willard.

⁴ Letter from United States Embassy.

crease in influence, prestige, and security, by a consolidation of the smaller Latin-American countries into larger ones or all of them into one. It has also been advocated that the Portuguese Republic of Brazil be matched by a Spanish Republic formed by a union of all the American countries of Spanish origin.¹ There are considerable difficulties in the way of these projects. One is the partiality of Latin-Americans for centralization, or unification, as distinguished from decentralization, or confederation; the other is their fondness for public office. Both are inheritances from long experience of absolute government, lay and ecclesiastical. The idea of reconciling centralization with free representative government they imbibed with the doctrines of the French Revolution. It has proved impracticable. Union is less favorable than disunion to professional office-holding. The larger a nation the fewer the offices, especially the higher ones, in proportion to the people, and it is the higher offices that the politicians want. Since the emancipation of Latin-America the tendency of its component states has been to subdivide rather than to combine.

¹ J. S. Carranza, 1907, *opus cit.*, pp. 73, 74, 95.

This pernicious condition has perhaps been aggravated by the co-operation of the United States in the secession of Panama from Colombia.

We should be deluding ourselves if we thought that the nations of America would deliberately adopt measures to remove their differences of race, to assimilate themselves racially. In case of a common danger, nations differing in race may agree temporarily to support one another, as the French did the people of the United States, as these did the people of Cuba; as the French and Russian and British on one hand, and the German and Austrian and Italian on the other, are now co-operating in maintaining the balance of power in Europe. But they do not, in such cases, renounce their separate sovereignties or nationalities to adopt one in common. Races, like individuals, do not take kindly to the idea of changing their identity; that is what the transformation of a race amounts to. It will not be, therefore, to become like other people, or to prevent conflicts with them, so much as to improve the domestic, particularly the industrial, conditions under which they live, that Latin-Americans will at-

tend seriously to fostering immigration. An eminent authority on this question made nearly sixty years ago the following observations, to which events have recently given a peculiar interest and justification:

. . . it appears that the only hope of Central America consists in averting the numerical decline of its white population, and increasing that element in the composition of its people. If not brought about by a judicious encouragement of emigration or an intelligent system of colonization, the geographical position and resources of the country indicate that the end will be attained by those more violent means, which among men, as in the material world, often anticipate the slower operations of natural laws. To avert the temporary yet often severe shocks which they occasion, by providing for the necessities of the future, is the true mission and should be the highest aim, of the patriot and statesman. Central America will be fortunate if she shall be found to number among her sons men adequate to the comprehension and control of the circumstances under which she is placed, and which are every day becoming more complicated and exigent.¹

Probably nowhere is the mercurial and fickle variability of Latin-American humor, the in-

¹ *Notes on Central America*, by E. G. Squier, p. 58.

stability of Latin-American character, more apparent than in the trials and tribulations which brought to an early grave the peerless hero of the War of Spanish-American Liberation, the great "Libertador," Simon Bolivar.¹

The anguish of his disappointment and disillusionment wrung from him on his deathbed the following gloomy predictions, which, says Arguedas, have been literally fulfilled.

America is ungovernable; those who served the revolution have ploughed the sea. The only thing that can be done in America is to emigrate. Those countries will inevitably fall

¹ "From beginning to end his career was one long struggle, not only against the Spaniards but also against the disloyalty and the incompetence of the men who professed to work with him. . . .

"The figure of the worn-out Liberator, suffering in mind and body, deserted by all but a few, reviled by the majority of those who owed everything to him, is one of the most pathetic in history.

"His life is the history of a great success and a great failure. He succeeded in throwing off forever the yoke of Spain, which had pressed for three centuries on the shoulders of South America; he failed to set up, in place of Spanish dominion, anything resembling a stable, free, and popular government. . . . His failure hardly detracts from his greatness, for the task of making a great nation out of the materials he had to work with was an impossible one. He had to deal with peoples depraved by centuries of bad government. The mass of the population, sunk in superstition, servility, and ignorance, was without initiative or capacity. The majority of its leaders were either as ignorant as the rest or else had been endowed by the Spanish system with a narrow literary and legal education, which turned them into professional intriguers and fostered their innate vanity. With such materials

into the hands of the unchecked multitude to pass hence into diminutive tyrannies, devoured by crime and consumed with ferocity. If it were possible that a portion of the world should revert to primitive chaos, that would be the last state of America.¹

The governments of Latin-America have long been favoring a limited, or select, immigration, but do not seem to have sought a crossing of the Latin race with other races. That process is taking place in spite of unfavorable conditions, and will doubtless continue to do so, but with its traditional slowness. Next to the United States, Argentina is the American republic that attracts the largest European immigration. Statistics of marriages contracted by Argentinian residents of Buenos Ayres, the capital of the Argentine Republic, show about eight per cent of such unions to be Argentinian-English or Argentinian-German, the remaining ninety-two per cent being Argentinian-Latin, Argentinian-mestizo, or Argentinian-Indian.²

Washington could never have evolved the United States, and Napoleon could never have conquered the greater part of Europe."—(*Simon Bolivar*, by E. L. Petre, pp. 443, 448, 449.)

¹ Alcides Arguedas, *opus cit.*, p. 202. For an eloquent eulogy of Bolivar, see *Congrès de Panama*, by de Pradt, p. 82 *et seq.*

² Appendix B.

Arguedas looks principally to education for the awakening and development of Latin-America. But if his description of present conditions is correct, it would seem that immigration is indispensable to the introduction and administration of an effective system of public education. It may be that political and other reforms can be brought about by the importation and adoption of ideas without the absorption of new blood. But so far as the latter may be called for, how can it be better effected than by immigration from the United States? What other country will furnish people that can be so safely trusted to preserve republican institutions and make them work successfully? I know the obstacle to United States immigration formed by temperamental difference, amounting in individual cases to incompatibility. I have been a sorrowful witness of it on more than one occasion.¹ But the new population might well come in large measure from Great

¹ A distinguished statesman, thoroughly informed as to conditions in the Antilles, said not long ago that in Porto Rico and even in Cuba, while there is greater order and more honest administration than under the old régime, on the other hand, the rudeness of the Anglo-American officials makes them odious to the people, who are frequently offended by it, in their dignity or self-respect. So far as such conduct is typical it is a duty of all

Britain, Germany, and other non-Latin countries; and these contingents might mix better with the Latin-Americans than those of the United States. Latin-Europeans would mix with them still better, but the wise and loyal Latin-American will prefer in this new element a certain incompatibility of temperament with the quality of civic efficiency, to compatibility of temperament without that quality—North Americans, English, Scotch, Irish, Germans, Swedes, and Norwegians, to Spanish, French, and Italians,—leaving the latter to go to non-Latin countries, such as the United States, and improve them by imparting some of their warmth, vivacity, and grace to a comparatively cold, phlegmatic, ungainly people.

America to clamor for its correction. (J. S. Carranza, *opus cit.*, 1907, p. 19.)

Mr. Ugarte says: “. . . it is evident that nothing attracts us toward our neighbors of the North. By her origin, her education, and her spirit, South America is essentially European. We feel ourselves akin to Spain, to whom we owe our civilization, and whose fire we carry in our blood; to France, source and origin of the thought that animates us; to England, who sends us her gold freely; to Germany, who supplies us with her manufactures; and to Italy, who gives us the arms of her sons to wrest from the soil the wealth which is to distribute itself over the world. But to the United States we are united by no ties but those of distrust and fear.”—(*El Porvenir de la América Latina*, by Manuel Ugarte, pp. 93, 94.)

The Latin race is theoretical, abstract, idealistic, the cosmopolitan United States race is practical, concrete, materialistic. A certain admixture of the latter characteristics seems necessary to the perfection of Latin-American character. According to Garcia-Caldéron, a limited supply of United States capital and emigration may be judiciously admitted to Latin-America, but no considerable immigration of Yankees or intermarriage with them is desirable or possible. It is not desirable, because the good qualities to be thus engrafted upon Latin-Americans must be accompanied by many that are objectionable, and they can be obtained without such accompaniment, from other people.

We find practical mind, industrialism, political liberty in England; organization and instruction in Germany; in France inventive genius, culture, wealth, great universities, democracy. From these dominating people the New World should receive the legacy of Western civilization directly. . . . Europe offers to the Latin-American democracies what they ask of Saxon America, which was itself formed in the schools of Europe.¹

¹ Garcia-Caldéron, *opus cit.*, "Le Péril nord-américain," Livre V, Chap. III, p. 288.

To say that Saxon America was formed in the schools of Europe is to shut one's eyes to the fact that its early settlement was a protest and revolt against those schools, and to ignore its features of indigenous growth, the products of American environment and experience, such as climate, topography, aboriginal population, the co-operation of separate commonwealths in the defence of their peculiar civic principles; the new, original form of government which this led them to establish; the transformation in modern times of a wilderness into a thriving, populous commonwealth; the successful combination of republican government with vast territorial possessions. These and other developments of the United States, in the secrets of which Latin-America is peculiarly interested, cannot be studied at first hand, except in the United States.

That no considerable intermarriage of people from the United States with people of Latin-America is possible is inferred by Garcia-Calderón from the prejudice of "Les Yankees" against half-breeds, such as mestizos and mulattoes. Without such blending of the races there would be the same feeling on the part of the

white toward the colored that there is in the United States.¹ On both of these points his reasoning appears to be *a priori* and may be controverted by facts and figures. Racial prejudice in the United States has not prevented miscegenation. Intermarriage was in 1910 prohibited in twenty-six but allowed in twenty-four, of the States and Territories.² Between the years 1850 and 1910 the ratio of mulatto to total negro population has increased as indicated in the following table:³

Year	Negro Population	
	Black %	Mulatto %
1850.....	88.8	11.2
1860.....	86.8	13.2
1870.....	88.0	12.0
1880 (no figures).....		
1890.....	84.8	15.2
1900 (no figures).....		
1910.....	79.7	20.9

¹ *Opus cit.*, p. 289.

² *Race Distinctions in American Law*, by G. T. Stephenson, pp. 81, 98.

³ *Thirteenth Census of United States* (Abstract, p. 79). The definition of the term "mulatto" adopted at different censuses has not been entirely uniform. In 1870 and in 1910 the term was ap-

Between 1790 and 1910 the percentage of colored to total population has decreased from 19.3 to 11.1.¹ This is largely due to immigration of white people in excess of colored.²

As the preponderance of the white population over the colored increases, race feeling diminishes or becomes less manifest. As immigration contributes in the United States, it may contribute in Latin-America, to the solution of the race problem. Statistics indicate that it is doing so, at least in Central America. The immigration into that region has contributed almost twice as large an element of Germanic as it has of Latin population. Following are the contingents of foreign people "that have already established themselves in Central America":

German.....	2,400	French.....	2,050
English.....	5,000	Spanish.....	2,850
United States.....	5,700	Italian.....	2,300
	<u>13,100</u>		<u>7,200³</u>

plied to all persons having any perceptible trace of negro blood, excepting, of course, negroes of pure blood.

¹ *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1912, p. 39.

² The term "colored," as here used, includes Chinese, Japanese, other Asiatics, and American Indians.

³ These figures are compiled from a table in *Immigration—A Central American Problem*, by E. B. Filsinger. (*The Annals*, May, 1911.)

In conclusion, be it said that the two great wants of Latin-America are immigration and education. Statistics on these subjects are called for as indexes of its political condition and rate of growth and development.

II

THE WASHINGTON PRECEPT. THE MONROE DOCTRINE

The foreign policy of the United States is based upon three cardinal principles, which may be briefly stated as follows:

1. Abstention from permanent alliances with non-American powers, which was recommended by President Washington in his Farewell Address. This may be called the Washington Precept.

2. Non-intervention by non-American powers in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere, which was enunciated by President Monroe in a message to Congress and is known as the Monroe Doctrine.

3. Pan Americanism, or the co-operation of all American nations, for the maintenance of American control of the Western Hemisphere, which was originally suggested by the Colom-

bian patriot Bolivar. It may be called the Bolivar Idea.

Taking its general direction from the foregoing cardinal or fundamental principles, the policy of the United States, like that of other countries, is determined largely by minor principles dictated by exigencies of the day or hour. The fundamental principles are, generally speaking, a guide to every administration, irrespectively of political party. The minor principles change more or less with the administration. Among those which have had their day with our government or now have it, are the following:

1. Protective tariff.
2. Tariff for revenue.
3. Hegemony of the United States in America, significantly called the "Big Stick."¹
4. Diplomatic support of particular commercial enterprises of American citizens in foreign countries, known as "Dollar Diplomacy."

¹ This principle may be read in the following declaration of President Roosevelt's: "If a nation shows that it knows how to act with decency in industrial and political matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, then it need fear no interference from the United States. Brutal wrong-doing or impotence which results in the general loosening of the tides of civilized society may finally require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the United States cannot ignore its duty." —(Moore, *American Diplomacy*, p. 197.)

5. The financial regeneration of insolvent Latin-American republics, called by ex-President Taft "International Philanthropy."

6. Responsibility of the United States to European nations for offences of Latin-American nations.

7. The "open door" in China.

8. Independence for the Philippines.

9. United States command of the Pacific.

10. Exclusion of Mongolians from the United States.

11. Non-recognition of governments based on violence.

From this notice of minor principles let us return to the consideration of the major or fundamental principles of American policy.

THE WASHINGTON PRECEPT

Washington's words, spoken on the 17th of September, 1796, are these:

Against the insidious wiles of foreign influence, I conjure you to believe me, fellow citizens, the jealousy of a free people ought to be *constantly* awake, since history and experience prove that foreign influence is one of the most baneful foes of republican government. . . .

The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little *political* connection as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop.

Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities. Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. . . . Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalry, interest, humor, or caprice?

'Tis our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world; so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it—for let me not be misunderstood as capable of patronizing infidelity to existing engagements. . . . But in my opinion it is unnecessary and would be unwise, to extend them.¹

¹ Washington's Farewell Address. (*Writings of Washington*, by Ford, XIII, 315-318.)

The term "entangling alliance," not used in the Precept, aptly describes the particular sort of association which it proscribes. To come under that proscription an alliance must fulfil the following conditions:

It must be younger than the Precept; that is, it must have followed the latter.

It must be permanent; that is, of indefinite duration.

It must be partial; that is, it must associate the United States with some power in opposition to a third power.

It must be non-American; that is, the other power, or one of the other powers, must be of the Eastern Hemisphere.

There is no violation of the Washington Precept in an alliance which is older than the Precept, or temporary, or impartial, or formed with only American powers. Before the Washington Precept was enunciated the United States had more than once departed from the impartiality prescribed in it. On the 4th of May, 1778, two treaties, one of amity and commerce, and one of alliance, were ratified between France and the United States. By these compacts each party secured to itself the right

of fitting out vessels, condemning and disposing of prizes, enlisting soldiers or seamen, in the ports of the other. It was stipulated that the enemies of either power should be denied these privileges. The treaty of alliance guaranteed to "His Most Christian Majesty" the possessions then held by "the Crown of France in America" and "to the United States their liberty, sovereignty, and independence, absolute and unlimited." It expressly provided that, in case of a rupture between France and England, these reciprocal guarantees should have "their full force and effect the moment such war should break out." War between France and England broke out in 1792. In 1795—this war was then going on—a treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation was ratified by the United States with Great Britain in which it was agreed that there should be "a firm, inviolable and universal peace, and a true and sincere friendship," between those countries. This treaty obliged the United States to grant to Great Britain and deny to France the privileges formerly granted to France and denied to her enemies. How this treaty was denounced by France and defended by the United States is immaterial in

this connection. Each of the three treaties committed us to "foregoing the advantages of our peculiar situation." It was the recognition of this fact that prompted Washington to qualify his Precept with the words, "So far as we have already formed engagements," etc., and "so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty," etc.

There would be no violation of the Washington Precept in a permanent alliance for the suppression of piracy or of the slave trade, for the protection of American citizens or property in a country with the government of which the alliance was made, or in an alliance of whatever sort, contracted with all the nations of the world. In 1849 a treaty was negotiated, but not ratified, by which the United States assumed the duty of protecting the independence and territory of Nicaragua against encroachment by Great Britain. This engagement was injudiciously criticised in the United States Senate as a violation of the Washington Precept. The speaker was Senator J. M. Clayton. "This," he said, "is one of the first instances since the ancient entangling alliance made with France by the treaties of 1778, in which any minister of this government has attempted to disobey the sol-

emn injunction of the Father of his country to avoid all such political connections. For this is a political, not a mere commercial alliance.”¹

Secretary Seward erred in writing, as he did, to our minister at Madrid:

. . . it is a fixed principle of this government not to enter into entangling alliances of any kind with foreign nations . . . we once declined to enter into treaty stipulations for non-intervention [in Spain], with France and Great Britain . . . because we cannot enter into political contests [contracts] for any general purpose with foreign powers.

*For the same reason we have often declined to enter into the Congress of the American Republics.*²

Our declining to join France and Great Britain in the forementioned treaty stipulations was prompted by the “fixed principle” of the Washington Precept, but our declining, so far as we did decline, to enter the congress of the American Republics,³ was dictated by no settled principle but by temporary expediency.

¹ Speech, March 8, 1853.

² Seward to Perry, April 4, 1865. The italics are mine.—J. B.

³ Congress of Latin-American Republics, which met four times: at Panama in 1826, at Lima in 1847, at Santiago in 1856, and at Lima in 1864. The United States was asked to send delegates to each of the first two meetings. It sent two delegates to the first meeting, but one of them died on the way and before the other

In 1826 a congress of Latin-American republics was held in Panama. In the discussion which took place in the United States Congress, as to the advisability of sending delegates to this assembly, there was much opposition to the mission as tending to the formation of "entangling alliances" and thus to the violation of the Washington Precept. Its final approval was due not so much to reconciliation to such alliances as to the conclusion that no such alliance would result.¹ But no effective answer was made to the reasoning by which President John Quincy Adams, in a special message, had anticipated and refuted the contention that an alliance of the United States with an American republic would be a violation of the Washington Precept.

I cannot [he said] overlook the reflection that the counsel . . . was founded upon the circumstances in which our country and the world around us were situated at the time when it was

one arrived the meeting had adjourned. It was prevented from sending delegates to the second meeting by its being engaged in the Mexican War (*Pan-Amerika*, by S. H. Fried, p. 15). It was not invited to send delegates to the third or to the fourth meeting.

¹ House Reports, Resolutions Nos. 38, 40, 41, Nineteenth Congress, First Session, Vol. II; Rep. of Sen. Com. on Foreign Affairs, Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 232, Part 4 (1890).

given; that the reasons assigned by him for his advice were that Europe had a set of primary interests which to us had none or a very remote relation; that hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which were essentially foreign to our concerns; that our detached and distant situation invited and enabled us to pursue a different course. . . . Europe has still her set of primary interests with which we have little or a remote relation. Our distant and detached situation with reference to Europe remains the same. But we were then the only independent nation of this hemisphere, and we were surrounded by European colonies with the greater part of which we had no more intercourse than with the inhabitants of another planet. Those colonies have been transformed into eight independent nations, extending to our very borders, seven of them republics like ourselves, with whom we have immensely growing commercial, and must have, and have already, important political, connections, with reference to whom our situation is neither distant nor detached, whose political principles and systems of government, congenial with our own, must and will have an action and counteraction upon us and ours to which we cannot be indifferent if we would.¹

Subsequently to these meetings, and at the instance of the United States, the American re-

¹ Message to House of Representatives, March 15, 1826.

publics have united in forming what is now called the Pan American Union. Under the auspices of this association four Pan American conferences have been held; at every one of these the United States has been represented.

As thus far considered the Washington Precept refers principally, almost exclusively, to alliances. But it is interpreted also as deprecating intervention, either between nations or in the internal affairs of a particular nation. This interpretation is perhaps due to a confusion of Monroe's message with Washington's Farewell Address. For Monroe, as we shall see, dwells more on intervention and less on alliances than Washington. But even if borrowed from Monroe, the principle of non-intervention may properly be associated for convenience with the principle of abstention from entangling alliances, under the designation of the Washington Precept.

The participation of the United States in the Peace Conferences at The Hague has been misrepresented as indicating a desire to be in "the diplomatic game," to intervene in the international affairs of Europe. It is rather an advance on the part of the United States toward

the world as a whole, with a view to common action in the service of their common interests. The United States contemplates no intervention unless it be for the protection of American citizens or their property; this may be a duty superior to every policy. The participation of the United States in the allied expedition to Peking was dictated by this duty and military expediency. If this was a violation of the Washington Precept, it was one that Washington himself would have approved. There is nothing in the Precept against expansion. It may be construed as permitting of expansion within the sphere of the Monroe Doctrine, or the Western Hemisphere. The Philippines, being in the Eastern Hemisphere, are without the sphere of the Monroe Doctrine, or beyond the limits of our expansion as determined by the Washington Precept and the Monroe Doctrine. By our annexation of them we acquired "primary interests" closely related to those of Old-World nations; we thus forfeited, to an appreciable extent, the advantages of "our detached and distant situation." It is hard to see how we can ever retrace this step. Giving the Philippines independence means entering into agree-

ments either with foreign powers for their neutralization or with the Philippines themselves for our exercising a protectorate over them. Neither of these measures could be reconciled with the Washington Precept unless it were concurred in by the nations of the Old World generally.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE

History tells us that, after the downfall of Napoleon, the rulers of Prussia, Russia, and Austria formed a combination known as the Holy Alliance, which in 1822 emitted this declaration:

The high contracting parties, well convinced that the system of representative government is as incompatible with the monarchical principle as the maxim of the sovereignty of the people is opposed to the principle of divine right, engage in the most solemn manner to employ all their means and unite all their efforts to put an end to the system of representative government wherever it is known to exist in the states of Europe and to prevent it from being introduced into those states where it is not known.

This declaration refers only to the states of Europe. But it was natural to look forward to

its extension so as to apply to the Western Hemisphere.¹ It was as unfavorably received by Great Britain as it was by the United States.² On the 20th of August, 1823, Mr. Canning, the British Foreign Secretary, wrote to Mr. Rush, the United States Minister in London:

. . . Is not the moment come when our governments might understand each other as to the Spanish-American colonies? And if we can arrive at such an understanding would it not be expedient for ourselves, and beneficial for all the world, that the principles of it should be clearly settled and plainly avowed?

For ourselves we have no disguise.

1. We conceive the recovery of the colonies by Spain to be hopeless.

¹ Metternich wrote to the Austrian representative at Madrid (December 14, 1822): ". . . His Majesty will not cease to regard disorder and insurrection [*bouleversements*], whatever part of Europe may be the victim of them, as an object of lively solicitude for all governments." He thus menaced insurrectionary movements of which any "part of Europe might be the victim," in whatever parts of the world the movements might take place. (*Politique extérieure des Etats-Unis, Doctrine Monroe*, by Ernest Caylus, p. 11.)

The Congress of Verona (Holy Alliance) wanted to treat the Mexicans and Peruvians as it did Spanish or Italian liberals. (*L'Impérialisme Américain*, by Henri Hauser, p. 70.)

² People asked themselves in England whether the Holy Alliance might not some day think of re-establishing the reign of the Stuarts. (*Ibid.*, p. 12.)

2. We conceive the question of the recognition of them as independent states to be one of time and circumstances.

3. We are, however, by no means disposed to throw any impediment in the way of an arrangement between them and the mother country, by amicable negotiations.

4. We aim not at the possession of any portion of them ourselves.

5. We could not see any portion of them transferred to any other power [than Spain] with indifference.

If these opinions and feelings are, as I firmly believe them to be, common to your government with ours, why should we hesitate mutually to confide them to each other, and to declare them in the face of the world?

If there be any European power which cherishes other projects, which looks to a forcible enterprise for reducing the colonies to subjugation, on the behalf or in the name of Spain, or which meditates the acquisition of any part of them to itself, by cession or by conquest, such a declaration on the part of your government and ours would be at once the most effectual and the least offensive mode of intimating our joint disapprobation of such projects.¹ . . .

The "European power" referred to in the last paragraph was France. In that day a colony was a dependency, condemned to exploitation

¹ *Massachusetts Historical Society, Proceed.*, 2 S., XV, 415, 416.

by the mother country and excluded from the privilege of trading with any other country. Canning, therefore, could not approve of colonies unless they were British. He saw an opportunity to thwart the hope which France entertained, that, on the reconquest of Spanish-America, there would be a large division of the conquered territory reclaimed, subdued, and turned over to her. He knew of the immense commerce which had been diverted from Spain to Great Britain in consequence of the revolt of the Spanish-American colonies, and desired that this vast trade be retained by his country. It was to secure these ends, unmoved by love or regard for the republic of the United States or the Spanish-American republics, or republican institutions anywhere, that he approached the minister of the United States at London with his suggestion of an *entente* between the two governments.¹ He was farseeing enough to apprehend an expansion of the United States over Spanish-American territory that might prove as detrimental to British commerce as the possession of such territory by powers of the Holy Alliance. His clause 5 is accordingly worded

¹ *The Monroe Doctrine*, by T. B. Edgington, p. 7.

so as to debar the United States from such expansion, so far as diplomatic equivocation could do so. The United States declined the British overture because its acceptance might:

1. Implicate the United States in the "federal system" of Europe.
2. Give offence to France.
3. Obstruct the policy of the United States in America.

Our secretary of state wrote to our minister in London, replying to Canning's five propositions, as follows:

1. *We conceive the recovery of the colonies by Spain to be hopeless.*

In this we concur.

2. *We conceive the question of the recognition of them as independent states to be one of time and circumstances.*

We did so conceive it until . . . we had come to the conclusion that the recovery of them by Spain *was hopeless*. Having arrived at that conclusion, we considered that the people of those emancipated colonies were *of right*, independent of all other nations, and that it was our duty so to acknowledge them. We did so acknowledge them in March, 1822, from which time the recognition has no longer been a question to us. . . .

3. *We are, however, by no means disposed to*

throw any impediment in the way of an arrangement between them and the mother country, by amicable negotiations.

Nor are we . . . an arrangement between them and Spain, by amicable negotiation is one which, far from being disposed to impede, we would earnestly desire, and by every proper means in our power endeavor to promote, provided it should be founded on the basis of independence. . . .

4. *We aim not at the possession of any of them ourselves.*

5. *We could not see any portion of them transferred to any other power [than Spain] with indifference.*

In both these positions we concur. And we add:

That we cannot see with indifference any attempt by one or more powers of Europe to restore those new states to the crown of Spain, or to deprive them, in any manner whatever, of the freedom and independence which they have acquired.¹

President Monroe replied to the Declaration of the Holy Alliance by his memorable message to Congress of December 2, 1823. There is

¹ J. Q. Adams to Rush, November 29, 1823 (*Am. Hist. Rev.*, VIII, 36). The italics in the propositions are mine, those in the answers are Adams's. The last paragraph leaves no doubt as to the difference, in Adams's mind, between the position of the United States and that of Great Britain, with respect to expansion in Spanish-America.

much in it that refers to non-intervention, and the Monroe Doctrine has been consequently understood to include the Washington Precept. But it does not. For the Washington Precept, Washington's Address should be consulted primarily and Monroe's message secondarily. Monroe expressed himself as follows:

. . . the occasion [of determining the Russian northwest boundary] has been judged proper for asserting as a principle, in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers. . . .

It was stated at the commencement of the last session [of Congress] that a great effort was then making in Spain and Portugal to improve the condition of the people of those countries and that it appeared to be conducted with extraordinary moderation. It need scarcely be remarked that the result has been, so far, very different from what was then anticipated. Of events in that quarter of the globe, with which we have so much intercourse, and from which we derive our origin, we have always been anxious and interested spectators. The citizens of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor of the liberty and happiness of

their fellow men on that side of the Atlantic. In the wars of the European powers, in matters relating to themselves [and not to the United States], we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced, that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defence. With the movements in this hemisphere we are, of necessity, more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective governments. And to the defence of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted.

We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered, and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and

on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as a manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States. In the war between these new governments [of Latin-America] and Spain we declared our neutrality at the time of their recognition [by us], and to this we have adhered and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur which, in the judgment of the competent authorities of this government, shall make a corresponding change on the part of the United States indispensable to their security.

The late events in Spain and Portugal show that Europe is still unsettled.¹ Of this important fact no stronger proof can be adduced than that the allied powers should have thought it proper, on any principle satisfactory to themselves, to have interposed by force in the internal concerns of Spain. To what extent such interposition may be carried, on the same principle, is a question in which all independent powers, whose governments differ from theirs, are interested; even those most remote, and surely none more so than the United States. Our policy in regard to Europe, which was

¹ At the instigation of the Holy Alliance, a French army of 100,000 men, under the Duke of Angoulême, marched into Spain in April, 1823, and replaced Ferdinand VII upon the throne, in opposition to the wishes of the great majority of the Spanish people.

adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government *de facto* as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting in all instances the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none. But in regard to these continents, circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different. It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness, nor can any one believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition in any form with indifference.¹

About as this paper was being read in Congress a circular emanated from the King of Spain, calling for support from the sovereigns of the Holy Alliance, *to maintain in America the principle of order and of legitimacy, the subversion of which would soon be communicated to Europe.* This appeal remained unanswered, not—it would seem—on account of the Monroe Doc-

¹ Sen. Doc. 1, 18 Cong., 1 Sess.

trine, but because of a declaration made by Great Britain that European intervention in Spanish-America would impel her to recognize the independence of the revolted colonies. Rupture with Great Britain would have re-animated the liberal parties and again shaken the thrones of Europe. This consideration was enough to prevent it.¹

Canning has been credited with suggesting the Monroe Doctrine to the United States.² He suggested what may be called the Canning Doctrine, according to which the United States, as well as Great Britain and other European countries, was to be prevented from expanding in the Western Hemisphere, a very different thing from the Monroe Doctrine, which allowed of such expansion by the United States, but not by Great Britain or any other non-American country.

The object of Canning appears to have been to obtain some public pledge from the government of the United States, ostensibly against the forcible interference of the Holy Alliance between Spain and South America, but really or especially against the acquisition to [*sic*] the

¹ Ernest Caylus, *opus cit.*, pp. 21, 22.

² Frelinghuysen to Lowell, May 8, 1882.

United States themselves of any part of the Spanish-American possessions. . . . By joining with her, therefore, in her proposed declaration, we give her a substantial and perhaps inconvenient, pledge against ourselves, and really obtain nothing in return.¹

Besides the United States, France was, as already indicated, to be excluded from Latin-America. In defence of his not having arrested the French invasion of Spain, Canning said: "I sought for compensation in another hemisphere. . . . I resolved that if France had Spain, it should not be Spain *with the Indies* [Spanish-American colonies]. I called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old."² Pretension. *Fanfaronnade*. The Spanish-American colonies had won their independence by their own valor and had been recognized as independent governments two years before Great Britain took action in the matter.³ Canning was so irritated by the Monroe Doctrine that he retaliated by excluding the United States from participation with Great Britain and Rus-

¹ *Memoirs of John Quincy Adams*, VI, 177.

² Speech, December 22, 1826.

³ *The Diplomatic Relations of the United States and Spanish-America*, by J. H. Latané, pp. 86, 87.

sia in the settlement of the Alaska boundary question.¹

Great Britain, he maintained, could not "acknowledge the right of any power to proclaim such a principle, much less to bind other countries to the observance of it. If we are to be repelled from the shores of America, it would not matter to us whether that repulsion were effected by the ukase of Russia excluding us from the sea, or by the new doctrine of the President, prohibiting us from the land. But we cannot yield obedience to either. . . ." Describing the declaration of the President as "very extraordinary," he announced that the principle was one which his Majesty's ministers were prepared to combat in the most unequivocal manner, maintaining that "whatever right of colonizing the unappropriated portions of America has been hitherto enjoyed by Great Britain in common with the other powers of Europe, may still be exercised in perfect free-

¹ On the 4th of January, 1824, Rush wrote to Secretary Middleton that it was the intention of Great Britain to proceed separately, saying: "The resumption of its original course by this [British] government has arisen chiefly from the principle which our government has adopted, of not considering the American continents as subjects for future colonization by any European powers, a principle to which Great Britain does not accede."

dom, without affording the slightest cause of umbrage to the United States."¹ To the end of his career, it was Canning's purpose to thwart and oppose the Monroe Doctrine. On every occasion he impressed upon Latin-American governments the advantage for them of an alliance with Great Britain over an alliance with the United States.²

His successors in office have in general taken this attitude. No other nation has criticised and contravened the Monroe Doctrine to anything like the extent that Great Britain has. Incidentally to the Venezuelan controversy Lord Salisbury wrote to Secretary Olney that the Monroe Doctrine was not entitled to any one's respect.

¹ *The Monroe Doctrine*, by W. F. Reddaway, p. 97.

² *Later American Policy of George Canning* (*Am. Hist. Rev.*, 11, 704). See also *Monroe Doctrine* (*Ibid.*, 7, 676; 8, 28), *English Policy towards America, 1790-1* (*Ibid.*, 7, 706), *Mexican Diplomacy on the Eve of War with the United States* (*Ibid.*, 18, No. 2).

Under date of May 2, 1854, Canning wrote to the United States minister at London: ". . . With regard to the doctrine laid down by Mr. President Monroe in 1823, concerning the future colonization of the American continents by European states, as an international axiom which ought to regulate the conduct of European states, it can only be viewed as the dictum of the distinguished personage who delivered it, but her Majesty's government cannot admit that doctrine as an international axiom which ought to regulate the conduct of European states."

The prohibition of colonization in America and of intervention in its affairs, expressed or implied in the Monroe Doctrine, applied to all European powers, including those which have possessions in the American hemisphere, and may be considered as extended to apply to every non-American country. On the other hand, it does not apply to any American country. Articles and books have been written to prove that the United States has been untrue to the Monroe Doctrine by giving it such application as serves only the interests of the United States—one that is not altruistic, looking to the interests of all American nations, but solely or mainly selfish, looking to the interests of the United States.¹ This sort of criticism and resentment is due to misconception of the purpose and meaning of the Doctrine, which might be corrected by a careful reading of the passages which I have quoted. The Monroe Doctrine, while it here and there reveals an element of Pan American altruism, is in its general form and tenor frankly egoistical or national. It

¹See *La Doctrine Monroe et l'Amérique Latine*, by D. Antokletz; *Le Droit International Public*, by Calvo; *El Porvenir de la América Latina*, by Manuel Ugarte; *Les Démocraties Latines de l'Amérique*, by F. Garcia-Caldéron.

speaks for the United States and its interests and not for the Western Hemisphere and its interests.

To appreciate it in spirit as well as in letter, it is necessary to recognize, as its primary purpose, the safeguarding of the territory and political institutions of the United States. The doctrine is commonly confounded with the Bolivar Idea, which is expressed by the phrase, "America for Americans." Such error is illustrated in the following quotation from a work which, apart from this point, is most instructive and cannot be too highly recommended to students of the Monroe Doctrine and the Pan American movement, *El Derecho internacional americano*, by Alejandro Alvarez:

The declarations, in fact, of the Monroe Doctrine, have no value, except so far as they reflect the desire of all America and not the personal opinion of the President. It is this idea that one must grasp in order to know its real nature and its scope.¹ . . . The Monroe Doctrine represents the interests of the whole continent [both continents], and all the states of America are of accord for its maintenance. So that, while the United States has remained thus

¹ P. 139 (French translation).

far its only defender, Latin-American states would now be found strong enough to maintain it, if the United States should refuse to do so.¹

Every nation in America is welcome to co-operate with the United States in keeping non-American powers at a safe distance from the United States. That is what the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine means, but that is not what Mr. Alvarez means. He contemplates a safeguarding by each Latin-American country either of its own interests or of those of the Western Hemisphere as a whole. In the former case the policy is similar to that of the Monroe Doctrine; it may be considered as *a* Monroe Doctrine, but not properly as *the* Monroe Doctrine; in the latter case, that is, in its continental application, it is a form of the Bolivar Idea. The Monroe Doctrine has been construed as applying to the continents of North and South America and as applying to these continents and the adjacent islands. Monroe does, in his message, refer to the "American continents," but he refers also to "this hemisphere" as the sphere of his Doc-

¹ P. 173. See also *Le Vol de l'Aigle de Monroe à Roosevelt*, by Joseph Ribet, p. 38.

trine. He may have used the term "this hemisphere" as synonymous with "the American continents." But the probability is that his language on this point was purposely vague. It would have seemed pedantic had it been perfectly definite. It leaves the sphere of his Doctrine to be determined by events, with the American continents as a minimum. He apparently intended that it should comprise if circumstances seemed to warrant it, what is commonly called the Western Hemisphere, included between the twentieth and two hundredth meridians of longitude west of Greenwich. Daniel Webster would have restricted its application, so far at least as it involved the use of force, to the limits of North and perhaps Central America.¹

Mr. Polk in his messages to Congress always

¹ Referring to the Monroe Doctrine he said:

"... This declaration must be considered as founded on our rights, and to spring mainly from a regard to their preservation. It did not commit us, at all events, to take up arms on any indication of hostile feeling by the powers of Europe towards South America. If, for example, all the states of Europe had refused to trade with South America until her states should return to their former allegiance, that would have furnished no cause of interference to us. Or if an armament had been furnished by the allies to act against provinces the most remote from us, as Chili or Buenos Ayres, the distance of the scene of action diminishing our apprehension of danger, and diminishing also our means of ef-

referred to the Monroe Doctrine as applying to the North American continent, and never as extending to the entire hemisphere.¹ A number of United States writers on the Monroe Doctrine have expressed the belief that it was unnecessarily extensive in its application and suggested that it be narrowed down. Such views have not gained any considerable acceptance. The sphere of the Monroe Doctrine is more likely to be enlarged than it is to be diminished. Exemptions from its application will be rarer in the future than they have been in the past.

It should be observed that the Monroe Doctrine does not commit the United States to any belligerent action. The most that it threatens is the unfriendliness of the United States toward an offending nation. This threat may

fectual interposition, might still have left us to content ourselves with remonstrance. But a very different case would have arisen, if an army, equipped and maintained by these powers, had been landed on the shores of the Gulf of Mexico, and commenced the war in our own immediate neighborhood. Such an event might justly be regarded as dangerous to ourselves, and on that ground call for decided and immediate interference by us. The sentiments and the policy announced by the declaration, thus understood, were, therefore, in strict conformity to our duties and our interest.”—(*Speech on the Panama Mission*, April 14, 1826.)

¹ J. D. Richardson, *opus cit.*—T. B. Edgington, *opus cit.*

gain or lose in force with the armament at our command, but it is far from being absolutely dependent on it for effect. The lowness of our present tariff on imports is a factor to be reckoned with in the execution of our foreign policy. Nations will not lightly expose themselves to losing the market which it allows them.

The Monroe Doctrine contemplated that any expansion which the United States might enter upon should not meet with opposition from any colony established in America subsequently to the announcement of the Doctrine. It was to protect the government and institutions of the United States, not only where they existed in 1823 but wherever they might extend themselves to on American soil. The construction of the Panama Canal has brought South America more than one thousand miles nearer the United States and an intensely sensitive part of the United States. The Panama Canal is spoken of as a part of the coast-line of the United States; in whatever sense that may be true, in that same sense all of Central America and Mexico are a part of the United States. Who will now say that any point in South America is far enough from the United States

to admit of its colonization by a non-American power without offending against the spirit as well as the letter of the Monroe Doctrine?

It has been said in substance that because we have taken the Philippines, thus invading non-American territory, we have no right to claim immunity for our hemisphere from invasion by non-American powers; that our holding the Philippines is inconsistent with our holding the Monroe Doctrine.¹ Independently of the Washington Precept, the Monroe Doctrine does not preclude the acquisition and control by the United States of territory outside of the Western Hemisphere. The United States could not complain if the Old World should promulgate a Monroe Doctrine directed against the New, but it is not called upon to anticipate that contingency, so long as its possessions in the Eastern Hemisphere are insignificant in comparison to the territories in the Western Hemisphere possessed by powers of the Eastern. About half of the Western Hemisphere is European.² The American territory in the East-

¹ Democratic national platform for 1900.

² The territory of Canada is represented on British maps as extending northward to the Pole. The claim thus made is probably contestable, but, so far as can be learned, has not been either

ern Hemisphere consists of the Island of Guam and the Philippine Islands, which form together about $\frac{1}{300}$ of the area of the hemisphere. The possessions of Great Britain alone in America aggregate more than thirty times the area of all the colonies of the United States. But for our misreading of the Monroe Doctrine we should probably be in possession of a number of islands in the Pacific Ocean now owned by European powers and of all the Samoan Islands, instead of sharing them with Germany. Our portion of the latter comprises but seven per cent of their area and about thirteen per cent of their population.

Under the conditions attending the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine no non-American power could be thought of as occupying any part of a Latin-American country without establishing there some government less in sympathy, or more out of sympathy, with our own,

contested or conceded by the United States or by the other nations of the world.

Palmyra Island, in the Pacific Ocean, is commonly represented as a British possession. It appears on our Land Office map as belonging to the United States. Clipperton Island, off the west coast of Central America, has been represented as British, also as French, and as Mexican. It appears to belong to Mexico and to be leased to the Pacific Islands Company, a British corporation.

and more dangerous to it, than the one which it replaced.

The republican character of the United States gave no concern to the courts of Europe, for at that time politicians and publicists believed that that form of government was reserved for feeble states.

The monarchic form of government was a matter of concern to the United States and the other states of America; they knew by experience, and the pact of the Holy Alliance justified them only too well on this point, that that form of government was expansive and tended to enlarge its colonial domain.¹

The time may come when forms of government will be substantially the same the world over. The Monroe Doctrine, if directed only against obnoxious forms of government, would then lose its *raison d'être*. But it has another objective. It is directed not only against certain forms of government, but also, and perhaps more, against an association of governments and its collective policy. The two ideas, form of government and collective policy, Monroe comprehended in the term "political system." The

¹ *Le Droit international américain*, by Alejandro Alvarez, p. 38 n.

difference between the political system of the Holy Alliance and that of America "proceeds," he says, "from that which exists in their respective governments." The source to which he particularly refers is the principle of divine right, which is not yet wholly abandoned. But if it were, the difference might proceed from other principles or interests, common to Old-World governments and not to ours, such as hereditary privileges, European hegemony or solidarity, and groupings or combinations of powers with their respective policies. If every nation of Europe were a republic modelled after our own, a European system might still exist, with its *triple entente* and *triple alliance*, its equilibrium, or balance of power, and its concert, with its congresses, for intervening in the affairs of particular nations. Let us suppose two or three nations of Europe, whatever their forms of government, competing actively for the possession or acquisition of territory, in America. Can we not see all Europe concerning itself in the contest, and the concert or the opposing combinations of powers agitating or influencing all the nations of America? Let us go a little farther and suppose a European power to acquire posses-

sion and control of any important strategic or commercial position in the Western Hemisphere, can we not imagine its raising in the course of time a Near Eastern question for the powers of our hemisphere even more troublesome than the Near Eastern puzzle of Europe; can we not conceive of European control and influence in America so enlarged as to make the Western Hemisphere but an annex to the Eastern, eliminating the New World as such by incorporating it in the Old, nullifying the Washington Precept by making the affairs of European nations the affairs of American, and necessarily extending the concert and the alliances and *ententes* of Europe to include all America?¹ It is against the complication and distortion of our policy by such conditions as these, quite as much as against any transformation of our polity by monarchic, dynastic, or other specific forms or features of government, that the Monroe Doctrine is directed. If we are to have a "political system" for America, it is to be essentially

¹In former centuries the practice of the balance of power was confined to Europe. . . . The acquisition of territory by any great power anywhere in the whole world is now held to disturb the balance, and to entitle other powers to a compensating acquisition. (*The Future Peace of the Anglo-Saxons*, by S. L. Murray, p. 18.)

American and not an importation or an imposition from Europe.

The Monroe Doctrine interdicts the Europeanizing of any portion of the Western Hemisphere, not only without but even with the express consent of the American government or governments immediately concerned. It not only protests against any "interposition for the purpose of oppressing" an American nation, but goes on to say "or controlling in any other way their destiny." It finally asserts in substance that, if an American government should express itself as consenting to European domination, the United States would assume that it was disregarding or misrepresenting the will of the people.¹

It is hard to believe that such language was meant to be taken literally. But it was, and derived certainly some justification from the arbitrary quality of the nominally republican *régime* prevailing in the Latin-America of that day. Presidential dictators who would assassinate

¹ ". . . nor can any one believe that our Southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. . . . It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition in any form with indifference."—(Monroe Doctrine, p. 50 *ante*.)

ate their opponents and sack their country's treasury might not scruple to barter away its liberty and sovereignty. President Melgarejo of Bolivia, an admirer of Napoleon and an imitator of his absolutism, ceded to Chili and to Brazil considerable portions of territory, because those countries had turned his head with honors and decorations.¹ What the United States would do to-day if a Latin-American country should invite a European one to annex it, in whole or in part, is happily an idle question. There is no indication that any nation of Latin-America would willingly part with its sovereignty or any of its territory, and there is much to indicate that Latin-Americans are, if possible, more opposed to foreign dominion, more attached to their native land and determined to preserve it inviolate, than the people of the United States themselves. But they are not all capable of resisting the temptation to raise money by granting concessions or leasing islands or harbors, which is the next thing to surrendering territory and sovereignty. It is not for a citizen of the United States, whose government has from another American government a per-

¹ Alcides Arguedas, *opus cit.*, p. 209.

petual lease of four hundred and seventy-four square miles of territory, to indulge in severe or sweeping condemnation of such transaction. But he may consistently deprecate the habitual resort to it by an American toward a non-American government, and in so doing should have the approval and support of every Pan American.

The Monroe Doctrine opposes, not only the substitution in the Western Hemisphere of non-American for American sovereignty, whether with or without the consent of the American nations affected—but also the establishment in America of foreign sovereignty where no American sovereignty exists. When the Monroe Doctrine was promulgated there were vast territories in regions now embraced within the limits of Ecuador, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Argentina, that were not parts of any recognized nation, that were *res nullius* in the light of so-called international law. The Monroe Doctrine has been pronounced internationally illegal because it undertakes or undertook to prevent the appropriation of such unappropriated territories by European governments. Nations, it is said, cannot be prohibited from taking *res nul-*

lius territories on the ground that such nations belong to a different hemisphere or another continent. That is why President Monroe did not base his action on so-called international law. He put it on the ground of necessity, necessity of self-preservation, the first law of nature. The Monroe Doctrine enunciates not a legal right, but a national policy based upon a natural right as inalienable from nationality as life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are inalienable from humanity. With a view to the safety of the United States the Monroe Doctrine meant that the unclaimed territories of the Western Hemisphere should come under control only of American powers. It has, in fact, been considered by more than one authority as proclaiming that all such territories were actually under American sovereignty.

With the exception [said John Quincy Adams] of the existing European colonies, which it was in no wise intended to disturb, the two continents consisted of several sovereign and independent nations whose territories covered their whole surface.¹

¹ Message to House of Representatives, March 15, 1826. "According to the message [of President Monroe] there were not in America as there were in Europe territories unappropriated

While recognizing the existence of European possessions in the Western Hemisphere and promising not to interfere with such "existing colonies or dependencies," the Monroe Doctrine does not commit the United States to permitting their transfer by one European power to another. On the contrary it warrants the prevention of such transfer as a fresh extension of the "political system" of Europe to the Western Hemisphere.

In 1825, Henry Clay, as secretary of state, declared to the governments of France and England that the United States would not permit Spain to transfer Cuba and Porto Rico to other European states. With respect to Cuba,

in law, although in fact the greater part of the American hemisphere was in that situation. That declaration was not new. Spain had made it at the beginning of her colonial period, with regard to her colonies. The origin of her pretensions is found in a bull of Pope Alexander VI, who separated by a geographical line the possessions of Spain from those of Portugal. Spain found herself, then, sovereign in law of all lands situated west of that line. Although the bull has not been respected by the other powers, it is none the less true that Spain put forth this claim on a number of occasions . . . the Spanish government, by edict of June 30, 1865, relative to the litigation between Venezuela and Holland over the Island of Aves, declared that it belonged to Venezuela, basing its decision on Spain's having formerly considered that island as a part of its domain, although recognizing that Spain had never occupied it effectively."—(Alvarez.) See also F. Garcia-Caldéron, *opus cit.*

similar declarations were made by Secretary Van Buren in 1830 and by Secretary Webster in 1852. In 1845 President Polk said that the United States would never acknowledge any transfer of territory, whether made by the desire of the inhabitants, by purchase, or by force, from any nation of North America to any nation of Europe.¹

President Grant said:

These dependencies are no longer regarded as subject to transfer from one European power to another. When the present relation of colonies ceases, they are to become independent powers exercising the right of choice and of self-control in the determination of their future condition and relations with other powers.²
and:

The Doctrine promulgated by President Monroe has been adhered to by all political parties, and I now deem it proper to assert the equally important principle that hereafter no territory on this continent shall be regarded as subject of transfer to a European power.³

We may consider as a corollary of the Monroe Doctrine that no non-American possession in America shall be transferred to any non-Ameri-

¹ W. F. Reddaway, *opus cit.*

² First annual message, 1869.

³ Message to Senate, May 31, 1870, relative to Santo Domingo.

can power. In 1877 Sweden returned the island of St. Barthélemy to France without opposition from the United States.

In spite of this isolated case, a declaration similar to Clay's would certainly be made by the United States, if a feeble European state should cede a colony in the Caribbean Sea to a powerful one; such cession would be considered by the United States as a danger. This policy, which at first sight seems high-handed, is not unprecedented; in Europe the great powers would certainly oppose such cessions of territory, in the name of the equilibrium.¹

President Grant in his annual message of 1870 said: "The time is not probably far distant when, in the natural course of events, the European political connection with this continent will cease," and his secretary of state, in an accompanying report, remarked that the policy announced by Monroe "looks hopefully to the time when, by the voluntary departure of European governments from this continent and the adjacent islands, America shall be wholly American."²

That the United States means to be supreme

¹ Alvarez, *opus cit.*

² *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1870-71, p. 257.

among the nations of the Western Hemisphere, with a view to the gradual absorption of the latter, seems to be a postulate of all foreign critics of the Monroe Doctrine.

It seems unnecessary to repeat [says Manuel Ugarte] that the United States have not entertained the idea of assuring our independence as something permanent, but have meant to prevent any other power from establishing itself in what they consider as destined sooner or later to be theirs.¹

Whether the North American peril here referred to be exaggerated or not, exception may be taken to the author's linking it as he does with the Monroe Doctrine. The jingos of the United States can find no justification for an aggressive policy toward Latin-America in the Monroe Doctrine; and the patriots of Latin-America can find none in it for attributing such

¹ *Opus cit.*, p. 136. See also *La Doctrina de Monroe*, by J. M. Cespedes, Havana, 1893; *Les Démocraties latines de l'Amérique*, by F. G. Caldéron, p. 274 *et seq.*

"*America for the United States.* American statesmen, whether Democratic or Republican, have never understood the declaration of President Monroe but in this sense."—(*Autour de l'Isthme de Panama*, by Joseph Justin, President of the National School of Law of Port au Prince, p. 28.) To the same effect *Das Völkerrecht systematisch dargestellt*, by Doctor Franz v. Liszt, p. 37, and *L'Impérialisme américain*, by Henri Hauser, p. 76.

a policy to the United States. The Monroe Doctrine claims nothing for the United States to the exclusion of other American nations; it pretends to nothing for the United States that it does not concede to every other American nation. If in the Monroe Doctrine the United States arrogates to itself supremacy in the Western Hemisphere, it is only with respect to non-American powers, and with respect to them it wishes every American nation to be supreme. There is nothing in the Monroe Doctrine that makes its provisions a monopoly of the United States. Nothing would suit the United States better than to have every American nation promulgate a similar doctrine for itself.

Our absorption of a portion of Mexico and our intervention in Colombia are pointed to as evidence of land cupidity on the part of the "Yanquis." I shall not undertake to justify in every respect the courses taken by the United States in the acquisition of these two additions to its territory; on the contrary, I admit that there is much in them to condemn. I wish only to point out that they were not prompted by lust of conquest, but were both actuated by specific motives of a different character.

Let us unhesitatingly assert [says a Latin-American] that the United States, as a nation, has never confirmed any of these theories of questionable tendencies, either by explicit enactments of the Congress or by their inclusion in treaties or other documents of official character. The great republic is, therefore, absolutely without reproach as regards the projects of hegemony which have been attributed to it with more malice than justice.¹

Mr. Maurice de Waleffe, in his work *Les Paradis de l'Amérique Centrale*, asks the question: "Will the United States gobble up Spanish-America?" and answers it in the affirmative. "The Yankee tide," he says, "after having absorbed Mexico, will overflow Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, to stop only before the three substantial states of South America: Brazil, Argentina, and Chili. But the wave that will come to beat at their feet will have acquired colossal proportions, and it is doubtful whether they will be able to do more than give it a temporary check. By that time—and those of us

¹ *Monroïsme*, by F. Capella y Pons, Honorary Secretary of the Uruguayan Legation at Berlin.

As I write these lines, both of the political parties in Mexico, the ins and the outs, are trying with more or less success to make political capital out of the supposed longing of the United States for more Mexican territory.—J. B.

twenty years of age will live to see it—the United States will be more powerful than all Europe united.”

If the United States had the sinister designs attributed to it respecting the other nations of America, it would want those nations to remain weak. It would assume the rôle of their defender, and deprecate every attempt on their part to develop their power of self-defence. But what does the history of America show? That the United States has repudiated the rôle of champion for Latin-American countries, that it welcomes the growth of those countries, their advance in the arts of peace and of war, their confederation, their contriving in any way to strengthen themselves separately and collectively.

The United States is not seeking territory. It is true that its people go into foreign countries, notably Canada, Mexico, and others of Latin-America, and they will probably do so in ever-increasing numbers. This prospect has created among the smaller and weaker countries an apprehension that the Yankees may get control of them, either by force or by the ballot, and bring about their annexation to the United

States. The feeling is natural and perhaps not wholly groundless, but it may be said that there is little likelihood of any uprising or revolt on the part of settlers from the United States against a government that gives them the essentials of what they get from their own; that affords them, by whatever forms and methods, protection in their persons and property. There has never been a case of settlers from the United States revolting against a fairly good government. In the case of Texas their revolt was against an intolerable military oligarchy.¹ To attempt to make United States adventurers, soldiers of fortune, filibusterers, etc., responsible for revolutions in Latin-American countries is unreasonable. That class of people only supply a demand, as do the machinery and other products of the United States and of other countries imported into Latin-America. They do not create the demand which they meet. That is the work of the countries to which they go. Military adventurers would not go to a country any more than sewing-machines would, if there were no use for them there.

¹ *Las grandes Mentiras de nuestra Historia*, by Francisco Bulnes, p. 261.

Why should not settlers from the United States do in other countries as settlers from foreign countries do in the United States, cast their lots irrevocably with the country which they adopt and become as loyal citizens of it as any? During our Civil War the foreign-born element of our population rendered more military service in proportion to its numbers than the native-born.¹ Should Canada ever be afflicted with the scourge of war, she may count upon similar support from her United States subjects. Should the war, by any possibility, be with the United States, it would be for those subjects a civil war. Some of them would probably desert her and some even fight against her, but the majority, assuming that her government continues as excellent as it is to-day, would stand loyally by her.

The Monroe Doctrine does not protect any American country, not even the United States, against encroachments by another American country. Should any Latin-American country, or combination of such countries, undertake to impose its form of government upon another or

¹ *Das Deutschtum in den Vereinigten Staaten in seiner geschichtlichen Entwicklung*, by A. B. Faust.

seek otherwise to oppress it, or seem by expansion to be endangering the integrity of the United States, any prevention that we might undertake would depend for its justification not upon the Monroe Doctrine, but upon the natural right by which the Monroe Doctrine was inspired and according to which it is interpreted—the right of self-preservation. This right has been recently invoked as the basis of the following Senate resolution, introduced by Senator Lodge, and passed on the 2d of August, 1912:

Resolved, that when any harbor or other place in the American continents is so situated that the occupation thereof for naval or military purposes might threaten the communications or the safety of the United States, the government of the United States could not see, without grave concern, the possession of such harbor or other place by any corporation or association which has such a relation to another government not American as to give that government practical power of control for naval or military purposes.

Commenting upon this enactment the senator says: "It rests on a much broader and older ground than the Monroe Doctrine. This resolution rests on the generally accepted principle

that every nation has a right to protect its own safety; and if it feels that the possession of any given harbor or place is prejudicial to its safety, it is its duty and right to intervene."

The Lodge resolution was not approved by President Taft. It may seem on this account to have less authority than the Monroe Doctrine. But the authority that comes of formal approval of such a declaration is of little importance. Its real authority can come only as the authority of the Monroe Doctrine has come—from its observance.

As there is nothing in the Monroe Doctrine that protects the United States from the rest of Latin-America, there is nothing in that doctrine that protects Latin-America or any part of it from the United States. If the United States should annex Canada, Cuba, Mexico, and all Central America, with or without the consent of those countries, any opposition that might be made by other American countries could be based only on the same natural right of self-protection.

The Monroe Doctrine does not make us the protector of any American country, except so far as an attempt upon that country may be

a danger or a menace to the United States. Whether or not it is such is to be decided by the United States and to govern its action in each case as it may arise. It was with this idea that, in 1826, during the debate on the Panama Congress, James Buchanan introduced and passed in the House of Representatives the following resolution:

In the opinion of the House the United States ought not to form any alliance with all or any of the South American republics, nor ought they to become parties with them to any joint declaration for the purpose of preventing the colonization upon the continent of America, but that the people of the United States should be left free to act in any crisis in such manner as their feelings of friendship toward these republics or as their own honor and policy may at the time dictate.

Manuel Ugarte exhorts his fellow Latin-Americans to guard against the "Yanqui" peril. If this was to be done by developing the resource of Latin-America, the United States could only wish them success; for in securing themselves against the United States they would be making themselves impregnable to Europe. But Mr. Ugarte's idea of security for Latin-

America is protection by European countries. From these, he says, Latin-America has nothing to fear and everything to hope. Think of it! Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Austria, Italy, those hardened, bristling, organized embodiments of intervention and conquest, of ruined nationalities, of blasted hopes and blighted aspirations toward liberty and independence, to be looked to by the feeble, disunited young republics of Latin-America for protection, and from what? From aggression by their considerate, pacific elder brother. Here is a Latin-American answer to Mr. Ugarte's proposition:

In July, 1850, Russia, England, and France signed at London a protocol establishing "the integrity of the Danish monarchy." Not only that; when, in 1864, the question of the duchies entered into the acute stage, the Prince of Wales had already married one of the daughters of Christian IX [of Denmark]. Besides the political reasons and the treaties, strong family ties weighed in favor of Denmark. So, notwithstanding the evidence and the imminent danger which threatened him, Christian IX appeared unconcerned and was firmly convinced that France would not abandon him and that England would not let Prussia take possession of

the ports of Schleswig. Austria and Prussia, however, threw themselves, for different reasons, upon feeble Denmark. England and France pretended not to know what was going on, and Denmark was despoiled. Schleswig-Holstein was taken from her, and the signers of the London protocol made no sign of protest.

Haytians, my brothers, ponder, ponder well this lesson. And remember, above everything, that the great powers of Europe profess the policy of "You scratch me; I scratch you." On many occasions the United States have shown themselves disposed to accord to us at least a strong moral support; and they have always treated us with the greatest courtesy.

It will be replied, perhaps, that their sympathies cover a thousand selfish considerations. Be it so; it is preferable to deal with interested parties who do not lack consideration for us than with friends who constantly maltreat us, while entertaining, no doubt, the same egotistic sentiments which they only know better how to dissimulate. . . . In my judgment, if it were imperatively necessary that Hayti should conclude an alliance, it is, at any rate for the present,¹ not in Europe that it should be sought.²

If Europe is debarred from colonization in America, what interest can it have in the pro-

¹ In 1886.

² *La Politique extérieure d'Haïti*, by J. N. Léger, formerly chargé d'affaires of Hayti in Paris.

tection of Latin-America, except as a foreign market? But considering it as a market, is Europe likely to prefer for it Latin-American control to United States control? If Latin-America does not develop the population and resources necessary to self-protection, the question will be, not whether the United States or Europe shall protect it, but whether the United States or Europe shall absorb it. To this question the Monroe Doctrine and the Bolivar Idea answer: Let it, then, be the United States.

It is a Latin-American who says:

Nations must trust their destinies to the efforts of their own people and strengthen themselves in the wisdom and probity of the latter. The danger for the states of the South American continent does not come from the North; the real peril will always be the incapacity and disorder within themselves.¹

¹ *Monroïsme*, by F. Capella y Pons, honorary secretary of the Uruguayan Legation at Berlin, pp. 158, 159.

III

CASES UNDER THE MONROE DOCTRINE

The cardinal policies of Great Britain and the United States—British command of the sea and the Monroe Doctrine—would seem at first blush not likely to conflict, the province of one being the oceans of the world and that of the other the land of one hemisphere. One would think that each of these policies could work itself out on its own element without coming in the way of the other. This might have been the case had man contented himself with the distribution of land and water which nature provided, and this he would perforce have done—so far as we can judge—had there been no such thing as intercontinental isthmuses offering the opportunity of changing the distribution of land and water in a way to affect the value of each. Great Britain could not without concern see the

United States secure for itself a shorter route from the middle Atlantic Ocean to British India than she had herself, nor could the United States countenance the occupation and fortification of American territory by Great Britain to the extent necessary to the construction and protection of an interoceanic railroad or canal. It was destined that these two considerations should contend for mastery wherever the question of interoceanic communication should come up in the Western Hemisphere.

Since the first third of the seventeenth century Great Britain entertained a project of taking possession of Nicaragua with the object of providing rapid communication between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. The early surveys made with this object in view represented the route as impracticable, and it was not until some two hundred years later that the acquisition of California led the United States to take steps toward the connection of the two oceans, and raised the question whether British or American interests were to be supreme in the American hemisphere. The first two articles of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty answered this question in favor of Great Britain. Article I

declared that neither nation would "ever obtain or maintain for itself any exclusive control over the said ship-canal: agreeing that neither will ever erect or maintain any fortifications commanding the same or in the vicinity thereof, or occupy, or fortify, or colonize, or assume or exercise any dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito Coast, or any part of Central America. . . ." Article II said: "Vessels of the United States or Great Britain traversing the said Canal shall, in case of war between the contracting parties, be exempted from blockade, detention, or capture by either of the belligerents, and this provision shall extend to such a distance from the two ends of the said canal as may hereafter be found expedient to establish." While the treaty was under consideration an American statesman wrote:¹

If Sir Henry Bulwer can succeed in having the first two provisions of this treaty ratified by the Senate, he will deserve a British peerage. . . . The treaty altogether reverses the Monroe Doctrine and establishes it against ourselves rather than European governments. . . . To get clear of this treaty will some day cost us a

¹ Buchanan to McClernand, April 2, May 30, 1850. (*American Historical Review*, V, 99-101.)

bloody war with Great Britain, should she remain as powerful as she is at present.

Sir Henry got his peerage. There has been no bloody war over the treaty, but the time has not yet come for saying that it has been averted. A bloodless one, with occasional truces, has been going on ever since the treaty was enacted. One of our secretaries of state wrote to our minister in London:

As an original proposition, this government would not admit that Great Britain and the United States should be put on the same basis, even negatively, with respect to territorial acquisitions on the American continent, and would be unwilling to establish such a precedent without full explanation.¹

Each party to the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty engaged "to invite every state with which both or either have friendly intercourse to enter into stipulations similar to those which they have entered into with each other."²

¹ Blaine to Lowell, November 19, 1881.

² "The attitude assumed on this occasion by the American secretary of state," says a Senate committee on foreign relations, "was so strangely inconsistent alike with the interests and with the dignity of the United States that it is impossible for the committee to advert to it without pain.

"Mr. Clayton weakly sought to induce Great Britain to

It was in the condemnation of this transaction that Senator Stephen A. Douglas made his reputation as an orator. In the following passages from his speeches one may catch some of the eloquence with which he moved his grave colleagues of the Senate and won the heart of Young America. The reference in his first few words is to the opportunity, renounced by Secretary Clayton, of having an exclusively American canal.

When Nicaragua desired to confer the privilege, and when we were willing to accept it, it was purely an American question, with which England had no right to interfere. It was an American question about which Europe had no right to be consulted. Are we under any more obligation to consult European powers about an American question than the allied powers were, in their Congress, to consult us, when establishing the equilibrium of Europe by the agency of the Holy Alliance. . . . England not consent! She will acquiesce in your doing what you may deem right so long as you consent to allow her to hold Canada, the Bermudas, Jamaica, and her other American possessions. . . .

abandon her own unfounded claims on the territory of an independent Spanish-American state by inviting her to share with us the duty and privilege, peculiarly our own, of protecting an inter-oceanic communication of infinite interest and concern to this country."

I was unwilling to enter into a treaty stipulation with any European power in respect to this continent, that we would not do in the future whatever our duty, interest, honor, and safety might require in the course of events. I am not prepared to prescribe limits to the area over which democratic principles may safely spread. . . .

You may make as many treaties as you please to fetter the limits of this giant republic, and she will burst them all from her, and her course will be onward to a limit which I will not venture to prescribe. Why the necessity of pledging your faith that you will never annex any more of Mexico? Do you not know that you will be compelled to do it, that you cannot help it; that your treaty will not prevent it, and that the only effect it will have will be to enable European powers to accuse us of bad faith when the act is done, and associate American faith and Punic faith as synonymous terms? What is the use of your guarantee that you will never erect any fortifications in Central America, never annex, occupy, or colonize any portion of that country? How do you know that you can avoid doing it? If you make the canal, I ask you if American citizens will not settle along its line; whether they will not build up towns at each terminus; whether they will not spread over that country and convert it into an American state; whether American principles and American institutions will not be firmly planted there? And I ask you how many years you

think will pass away before you will find the same necessity to extend your laws over your own kindred that you found in the case of Texas? . . . Jamaica at present commands the entrance of the [projected] canal; and all that Great Britain desired was, inasmuch as she had possession of the only place commanding the canal, to procure a stipulation that no other power would erect a fortification near its terminus. That stipulation is equivalent to an agreement that England may fortify, but that we never shall. . . .

Douglas related the following conversation between himself and Sir Henry Bulwer:

He [Sir Henry] took occasion to remonstrate with me that my position with regard to the treaty was unjust and untenable, that the treaty was fair because it was reciprocal—because it pledged that neither Great Britain nor the United States should ever purchase, colonize, or acquire any territory in Central America.

I told him it would be fair if they would add one word to the treaty so that it would read that neither Great Britain nor the United States should ever occupy or hold dominion over Central America or *Asia*. "But," answered he, "you have no interest in *Asia*." "No," answered I, "and you have none in Central America."

"But," said he, "you can never establish any rights in *Asia*." "No," said I, "and we don't

mean that you shall ever establish any in America.”¹

An agreement to which there is but one party can be violated only by that party. The United States being the only party to the Monroe Doctrine, the only nation that can violate the Monroe Doctrine is the United States. It committed such violation in ratifying the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty:

This treaty is the only instance in which the United States has consented to join with any European power in the management of political interests in the Western Hemisphere; and the treaty is remarkable not only because it is a departure from the settled policy of the United States not to sanction any European interference in the affairs of America, but because deviating in this way from our settled system, it undertakes, in concert with a foreign power, to determine a question the most important to the United States that can arise outside of our own territory.²

When after our Civil War the United States sought to establish coaling stations for its navy, it found itself debarred by the Clayton-Bulwer

¹ *Stephen A. Douglas*, by C. E. Carr, p. 36.

² Wharton's *Int. Dig.*, p. 168.

Treaty from acquiring such positions in Central America. Our secretary of state wrote to our minister in London suggesting a waiver by Great Britain of her rights in this respect:

It is becoming more and more certain every day that not only naval warfare in the future but also all navigation of war vessels in time of peace must be by steam. This necessity will occasion little or no inconvenience to the principal maritime powers of Europe, and especially to Great Britain, as these powers have possessions in various parts of the globe where they can have stores of coal and provisions for the use of their vessels. We are differently situated. We have no possession beyond the limits of the United States. Foreign colonization has never been favored by statesmen in this country, either on general grounds or as in harmony with our peculiar condition. There is no change or likely to be any in this respect. It is indispensable for us, however, to have coaling stations under our own flag for naval observation and police and for defensive war, as well as for the protection of our widely spread commerce when we are at peace ourselves. . . . Under these circumstances you will sound Lord Clarendon as to the disposition of his government to favor us in acquiring coaling stations in Central America, notwithstanding the stipulation contained in the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty.¹

¹ Seward to Adams, April 25, 1866.

Whatever propositions were made to Lord Clarendon, they met with no response. Outside of the Panama Canal zone, the United States has not to this day a coaling station in Central America. It made repeated attempts to secure one in the Island of Hayti, but was thwarted principally by Great Britain. That it succeeded, by the Spanish-American War, in securing one in Cuba and others in the Philippines is due to Germany, whose naval development determined Great Britain to cultivate friendly relations with the United States.

When it developed that the expedition sent by Napoleon III to Mexico had for its object the forcible substitution of a monarchical for a republican form of government, the United States expressed to France the belief that the undertaking would be defeated by the Mexicans themselves, but let it be understood that if it were not, Mexico would be assisted in defeating it by the United States. Our government refused to recognize the imperial usurper Maximilian; recognized the republican executive Juarez, and gave his patriotic followers financial as well as moral support. This proved sufficient to cause the withdrawal of the French troops.

Maximilian refused to abdicate and depart with the latter. As a consequence, his illegitimate Franco-Austro-Papal government was overthrown and he and two of his generals were captured and executed.

Upon the outbreak of our Civil War, the sympathy developed abroad for the insurgents had made it politic for the United States to respect the general dislike of European governments for the Monroe Doctrine. So, in our negotiations with France looking to the withdrawal of the French forces, care was taken not to mention it.

In 1862 Colombia (then New Granada), by virtue of a treaty ratified in 1848, solicited the intervention of the United States to establish order on the Isthmus of Panama. Secretary Seward's action thereupon was remarkably at variance with the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine and the ideas of Jefferson, Adams, Webster, Douglas, and other expounders and supporters of it. He wrote to our minister in London:

This government has no interest in the matter different from that of other maritime powers. It is willing to interpose its aid in execution of its treaty with New Granada and for the benefit of all nations. But if it should do so it would incur . . . danger of misapprehension of its ob-

jects by other maritime powers if it should act without previous consultation with them. . . .

The points to be remembered are:

First.—Whether any proceeding in the matter shall be adopted by the United States with the assent and acquiescence of the British and French governments.

Secondly.—Whether these governments will unite with the United States in guaranteeing the safety of the transit and the authority of the Granadian Confederation or either of these objects, and the form and manner in which the parties shall carry out such agreement.

I need hardly say that this government is not less anxious to avoid any such independent or hasty action in that matter as would seem to indicate a desire for exclusive or especial advantages in New Granada than the British Government can be that we shall abstain from such a course.¹

The proposals thus made were a double violation of the Monroe Doctrine:

1. In subjecting the course of the United States in this purely American matter to the censorship of European powers.

2. In inviting the intervention of European powers in the internal affairs of an American nation.

Mexico, being herself at this time a victim of

¹ Seward to Adams, July 11, 1862.

European interference, was particularly concerned about the latter and protested against it.¹ In a brief, not to say curt, reply Secretary Seward stated that his proposals to France and Great Britain had been misunderstood.² He did not and could not suggest any understanding of them that did not include an invitation for France and Great Britain to unite with the United States in guaranteeing "the authority of the Granadian Confederation." His reply was an indirect, evasive acknowledgment of the propriety of the Mexican protest.

Adams replied for Great Britain that the contingency for intervention had not yet arisen, the free transit across the isthmus not being threatened; but that if it were, "the British Government would readily co-operate with the United States in the measures that might be thought necessary to make good the privileges secured by the guarantee." Dayton replied that De Thouvenel "would not think it improper for the United States to interfere."

Seward made no protest when, in 1862, the settlement of Belize was erected into the Crown

¹ Romero to Seward, March 19, 1863.

² Seward to Romero, March 20, 1863.

Colony of British Honduras in violation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty as well as in contravention of the Monroe Doctrine. The embarrassments of the United States at home and abroad incidental to the Civil War may justify or excuse these instances of apparent indifference to the Monroe Doctrine.

In 1871 the independent republic of Santo Domingo negotiated with Spain to return of its own accord under that country's dominion; the United States protested and Spain renounced the plan.

The Monroe Doctrine was contravened by Great Britain and violated by the United States when these two nations concluded the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty inhibiting the United States from closing the Panama Canal to vessels of a nation at war with the United States and making the United States responsible to Great Britain for its treatment of other nations than Great Britain.

Nature and the Panama Canal have given to America the inside line to the Orient; Great Britain says that she shall not have it. In the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty she denies to the United States the right to close the Panama Canal.

Since the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine

most of the islands in the Pacific Ocean and within the Western Hemisphere have been annexed by European powers or transferred from one such power to another. Thus Great Britain colonized New Zealand in 1840, the Fiji Islands in 1874, and the Solomon Islands in 1885. The first two groups are wholly, the latter partly, in the Western Hemisphere.

THE FALKLAND ISLANDS

Whether the British colonization of the Falkland Islands contravened the Monroe Doctrine depends upon when it took place. If before the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine, it was sanctioned by it; if after that, it was prohibited by it.

The original discovery of the islands is commonly ascribed to an English navigator, John Davis, who was driven upon them by a storm in 1592, but there is conclusive evidence to prove that they were discovered long before that time, no one knows by whom.¹

They were first explored in 1690 by an Englishman, John Strong.

In 1748 Great Britain gave indication of coveting the islands and fitted out an expedi-

¹ *The Voyages and Works of John Davis*, by A. H. Markham, p. 108 n.

tion ostensibly for their exploration. Spain objected to the enterprise as unfriendly to her and it was abandoned.¹

The first government to take possession of the islands or establish a settlement upon them was that of France, which did both in 1764, giving to the settlement the name of Port Louis. The expedition was commanded by Captain L. A. de Bougainville. Until this time the islands had been uninhabited.²

A year later, in 1765, England, not knowing or pretending not to know of the French settle-

¹ *Thoughts on the late Transactions respecting Falkland's Islands*, by Samuel Johnson.

² The French commander built a fort and within it erected an obelisk, a face of which bore an effigy of Louis XV, King of France. Under this monument were buried some coin and a medallion, on one side of which was engraved the date of the enterprise and on the other the face of the King with the words, *Tibi serviat ultima Thule* and the legend: *Etablissement des Isles Malouines situées au 50 deg. 30 min. de lat. aust., et 60 deg. 50 min. de long. occid. mérid. de Paris, par la frégate L'Aigle, Capitaine P. Duclos Guyot, Capitaine de Brulot, et la corvette le Sphinx, Capit. F. Chénard de La Giraudais, Lient. de Frégate, armées par Louis-Antoine de Bougainville, Colonel d'Infanterie, Capitaine de Vaisseau, chef de l'expédition, G. de Nerville, Capitaine d'Infanterie, et P. d'Arboulin, Administrateur Général des Postes de France; construction d'un fort et d'un obélisque décoré d'un médaillon de sa Majesté Louis XV, sur les plans d'A. L'Huillier, Ingén. Géogr. des Camps et Armées, servant dans l'expédition, sous le ministère d'E. de Choiseul, Duc de Stainville, en Février 1764. *Conamur tenues Grandia. (Voyage autour du Monde par la Frégate du Roi LA BOUDEUSE et la Flûte L'ETOILE en 1766, 1767, 1768, 1769, by [L. A.] de Bougainville, 1771, p. 51.)**

ment, formally appropriated the islands in the name of the King of England, but without establishing any settlement. The point at which the ceremony of appropriation took place, already named by the French *Port de la Croisade*, was given the name of Port Egmont. The British commander was Commodore Byron.

In 1766 the first English settlement in the islands was founded at Port Egmont. In December of the same year the commander of this expedition, Captain MacBride, came upon the French establishment at Port Saint Louis and claimed the islands as possessions of Great Britain. He threatened to force a landing, but made no attempt to do so.

In 1767 Spain, jealous of France, claimed the islands as a dependency of the continent, which acknowledged her sovereignty. France recognized, at least ostensibly, the justice of this claim and surrendered the islands to Spain. The latter paid no attention to England, the presence of whose settlement at Port Egmont she must at least have suspected.

In 1769 a Spanish vessel sailing out from Port Louis came upon an English vessel coming from Port Egmont. Great was the surprise on

both sides to learn that the two settlements had for a number of years been neighbors, as it were, without knowing it. Each party was incensed that an enemy had established himself almost in the same locality with it. The British commander, Captain Hunt, ordered the Spaniard to depart. The Spaniard made an appearance of obeying, but two days later came back with a message from the Spanish governor complaining of the action of Captain Hunt. In another letter, sent at the same time, he supposed the British to be there only by accident and to be ready to depart at the first warning. In reply, Captain Hunt warned the Spaniards from the island, claiming them in the name of his King as belonging to the English by right of the first discovery and the first settlement. Correspondence ensued in which the Spanish governor formally warned the captain "to leave Port Egmont and to forbear the navigation of the seas without permission from the King of Spain." The captain repeated his former claim, declared that his orders were to keep possession, and once more warned the Spaniards to depart.¹

¹ *Thoughts on the late Transactions respecting Falkland's Islands*, by Samuel Johnson.

In 1770 the British settlement at Port Egmont was expelled from the islands by a Spanish force from Buenos Ayres.

In 1771 the settlement thus expelled was re-established in accordance with the following declarations:

BY SPAIN¹

LONDON, *January 22, 1771.*

His Britannic Majesty having complained of the violence done on the 10th of June of the year 1770, to the island commonly known as the Great Malouine, and by the English as the Falkland Island, in compelling by force the commander and the subjects of his Britannic Majesty to evacuate the port by them called Egmont, a measure offensive to the honor of his crown . . . his Catholic Majesty disavows the forementioned act of violence and . . . pledges itself to give immediate orders that things in the Great Malouine, at the port called Egmont, be replaced precisely as they were before the 10th of June, 1770 . . . the pledge of his Catholic Majesty to restore to his Britannic Majesty the possession of the Fort and Port called Egmont can and shall in no way affect the question of previous right of sovereignty in the Malouine, otherwise called Falkland Island. . . .

¹ Translated from the French.

BY GREAT BRITAIN¹LONDON, *January 22, 1771.*

. . . His Britannic Majesty . . . will regard the said declaration [of his Catholic Majesty's plenipotentiary] accompanied by the entire fulfilment of the said pledge on the part of his Catholic Majesty, as satisfaction for the injury done to the Crown of Great Britain.²

In 1774 the English settlement at Port Egmont was withdrawn voluntarily. But British colors were left flying and, on a fort, a leaden tablet bearing the following inscription:³

This is to certify to all nations that the Falkland Islands, as well as this fort, the storehouses, wharfs, harbors, bays and creeks, which pertain to it, belong of right only to his Most Sacred Majesty George III, King of Great Britain, France, and Ireland, defender of the Faith, etc. In faith of which this tablet has

¹ Translated from the French.

² It was in criticism of this pacific reconciliation, instead of a declaration of war for the vindication of British honor, that Junius produced the gem of English diction by which he lives in the memories of students of rhetoric:

"The King's honor is that of his people. *Their* real honor and real interest are the same." . . . "Private credit is wealth;—public honor is security.—The feather that adorns the royal bird supports his flight. Strip him of his plumage and you fix him to the earth."—(Junius, Letter XXXVI.)

³ Translated from the French.

been fixed and the flags of his Britannic Majesty unfurled and raised, as a sign of possession.

SAMUEL WILLIAM CLAYTON,
Commanding the Falkland Islands,
May 22, 1774.

About 1810 the Spanish settlement and garrison at Port Louis were withdrawn and the islands again left uninhabited.

On the 9th of July, 1816, the Argentine Republic declared itself independent of Spain.

In 1820 it took formal possession of the Falkland Islands, but domestic difficulties prevented its establishing any colony or settlement in them.

In 1821 the Argentine Government issued a decree for the encouragement of fishery on the coast of Patagonia, including the Falkland Islands, and regulating the formation of settlements thereon.

When the Monroe Doctrine was declared in 1823 unsuccessful attempts were being made in Argentina to establish a settlement on the Falkland Islands. The principal mover therein was one Louis Vernet.

In 1828 a settlement was started and Louis Vernet appointed by the Argentine Government as its director.

In 1829, at the suggestion of Vernet, and with a view principally to the exclusion of foreign fishermen from the waters of the islands, the Argentine Republic issued a decree providing for the appointment of a governor for the islands.¹ Great Britain protested against such action.² No answer was made to her communication and Vernet was appointed governor. The settlement thus became a colony.

¹ Art. I.—The Islands of Malouines and those adjacent to Cape Horn in the Atlantic Ocean shall be under the command of a political and military governor to be appointed immediately by the government of the Republic.

Art. II.—The political and military governor shall reside in the island of Soledad, on which a battery shall be erected under the flag of the Republic.

Art. III.—The political and military governor shall cause the laws of the Republic to be observed by the inhabitants of the said Islands and provide for the performance of the regulations respecting seal fishery on the coasts.

Art. IV.—Let this be made public.

RODRIGUEZ,
Salvador Mana de Carril.

² Making the following allegations:

1. That the authority which that government [Argentina] had thus assumed was considered by the British Government as incompatible with the sovereign rights of Great Britain over the Falkland Islands.

2. That those sovereign rights, which were founded upon the original discovery and subsequent occupation of those islands, had acquired an additional sanction from the fact that his Catholic Majesty had restored the British settlement, which had been forcibly taken possession of by a Spanish force in the year 1771.

3. That the withdrawal of his Majesty's forces from the Falk-

In 1831 three United States fishing schooners were seized by Vernet for violation of the fishing regulations.

In 1833, the United States and Argentina not having settled their dispute, Great Britain reoccupied the islands, reasserting her claims to sovereign control of them. She has been in possession of them ever since. Spain had taken them from France to prevent France from having them. Great Britain took them with the double object of preventing the United States from having them and of making more or less use of them as a depot of supply and repair for vessels rounding Cape Horn.

Upon the British reoccupation in 1833 the sovereignty became a subject of dispute between Great Britain and Argentina. The right of neither was perfect. Great Britain may be credited with the original exploration of the

land Islands, in 1774, could not invalidate the just rights of Great Britain, because that withdrawal took place only in pursuance of the system of retrenchment adopted at that time by his Majesty's government.

4. That the marks and signals of possession and of property left upon the islands, the British flag still "flying" and all other formalities observed, upon the occasion of the departure of the governor were calculated not only to assert the rights of ownership, but to indicate the intention of resuming the territory at some future period. (Palmerston to Moreno, January 8, 1834.)

islands. Beyond that she had no right in them but that of spoliation. The first power to appropriate the islands and the first to establish a settlement on them was France. From her they passed by cession to Spain. Argentina had held them by right of revolution, or forcible expropriation, from Spain. Neither Great Britain nor Argentina had, by treaty or otherwise, any cession from Spain. This was a case for arbitration. It was decided by an act of war, and may, therefore, be considered as a contravention of the Monroe Doctrine. Out of respect for British battle-ships, or in consideration of the remoteness of the Falkland Islands from the United States, or from both of these motives, the United States has not seen fit to press the Monroe Doctrine with respect to this bit of American territory.

The Monroe Doctrine was contravened by Great Britain when she assumed dominion over the Mosquito Coast and when she made a British dependency of the Bay Islands also in the following cases:

1. When, in returning the Bay Islands to Honduras, in 1859, she bound that republic, by the treaty of transfer, not to cede those islands, "or

any of them, or the right of sovereignty, to any nation or state whatsoever."

2. When, in transferring the Mosquito country to Nicaragua, in 1860, she stipulated in the treaty of transfer that the district assigned to the Mosquito Indians "may not be ceded by them to any foreign person or state, but shall be and remain under the sovereignty of the Republic of Nicaragua."

The United States sought to free itself from the objectionable restrictions imposed upon them as partners of Great Britain in Central America by proposing the abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. Great Britain replied by threatening that if the treaty were abrogated she would contravene the Monroe Doctrine at her discretion.¹

This threat was repeated when, in 1882, Secretary Frelinghuysen sought through Lord Granville to effect the abrogation of the treaty.²

¹ . . . From the abrogation of that compact, if it should take place, they [her Majesty's government] will hold themselves free to act in regard to Central America in the manner most conducive to the advancement of British interests. (Malmesbury to Napier, April 8, 1858.)

² Granville to West, January 14, 1882.

THE VENEZUELA BOUNDARY CONTROVERSY

A series of encroachments by Great Britain upon the territory of Venezuela, by pushing out the boundary line of British Guiana, was pronounced by President Cleveland in a message to Congress, December 17, 1895, to be a violation of the Monroe Doctrine; the British Government was informed through our minister at London that if the boundary line was not located by arbitration it would be determined, so far as the United States was concerned, by a commission appointed by the President. This vigorous measure was criticised in Great Britain as "shirt-sleeve diplomacy" and was not universally approved in the United States. Referring to it a United States senator said:

I cannot for a moment reconcile to any American precedent or to any principle of international law the proposition that in an *honest dispute* over a boundary line between a South American and a foreign state that [*sic*] we had a right to dictate the method of adjustment and, by the menace of war, compel submission to our terms, or that the Monroe Doctrine ever contemplated such an interference on our part.¹

¹ Speech of the late Senator Rayner of Maryland. The italics are mine. For American disapproval, see also Henderson's

If the case had been, as the senator says, "an honest dispute over a boundary line," the United States would not have taken it up. As long as it could be considered as such and perhaps longer, the United States abstained from every form of interference with it. The true character of the dispute may be judged from a general consideration of its origin and final settlement.

The whole region in controversy¹ belonged originally to Spain by right of discovery. It was subsequently transferred in part to Holland. Great Britain succeeded to the rights of Holland in 1814 and Venezuela to the rights of Spain when Venezuela seceded from Colombia, in 1830. The boundary line between the Dutch and Spanish, and consequently between the British and Venezuelan territories, had not been defined, and in 1841 trouble over it began. An English engineer named Schomburgk planted posts and other marks of dominion on what the Venezuelans considered as their territory. Ven-

American Diplomatic Questions, p. 443 *et seq.* This work gives the substance of President Cleveland's message and of the correspondence between the governments of Great Britain and the United States. (P. 411 *et seq.*)

¹ See map at end of volume.

ezuela protested and the British Government ordered the marks removed. In 1844 boundary negotiations were opened in England. Venezuela proposed the Essequibo River and Great Britain a line through the Moroco River—Lord Aberdeen's line. Venezuela declined the British proposition. In 1850 it was agreed between the two parties that neither should order or sanction any occupation of the territory in dispute. There the matter rested until 1878, when Venezuela again opened negotiations and offered to accept Lord Aberdeen's line. Great Britain declined this offer and proposed a new line which took in a large piece of additional territory on the coast, but followed the Aberdeen line in the interior. This proposition was declined. In 1881 Great Britain advanced her line on the coast a distance of twenty-nine miles toward the mouth of the Orinoco. A British man-of-war appeared there with telegraph-posts and wire. Venezuela protested and invoked the assistance of the United States. In 1884 she again opened negotiations with Great Britain, but a change ensued in the British ministry, and arbitration, which had been contemplated by it, was rejected. Again, in 1886, Venezuela

opened negotiations. Great Britain proposed a new line not so far west as that of 1878, but coupled with it a demand for the free navigation of the Orinoco River, which Venezuela rejected. In 1887 Venezuela tried to arrange again for arbitration, but in vain, and meantime Great Britain took possession of a large tract of territory in the interior, to which she had no valid claim. Unable to procure arbitration, Venezuela severed her diplomatic relations with Great Britain, but continued her endeavors to negotiate with her. Great Britain went on seizing territory. In 1889 she took possession of the main mouth of the Orinoco and declared Barima a British port. In 1890 she refused to accept arbitration as to anything east of an arbitrary line drawn by herself and put forward a new pretension over territory beyond that line, to which no claim had ever been made before. In 1893 Lord Rosebery proposed a line going far to the west of one which he had himself formerly proposed.

It is this land-grabbing at the expense of a weaker power that a United States senator referred to as "an honest dispute over a boundary line." The contention of the senator, if sus-

tained, would establish the principle that a European power who has any territory in the Western Hemisphere may acquire any amount more, if it can only make out for itself a case of boundary dispute; and it was on the occasion of a boundary dispute that the Monroe Doctrine was originally enunciated. But let us note how another United States senator expressed himself on this question when it was a live issue between Great Britain and the United States.¹ Henry Cabot Lodge said:

England's motives in her Venezuelan movements are, of course, entirely honorable and disinterested, because England herself admits freely on all occasions that these are her characteristic qualities in dealing with other nations. It is easy also to appreciate England's natural and strong resentment toward a country she had injured as much as she has injured Venezuela. But, at the same time, let England's motives or feelings be what they may, we are concerned for the interests of the United States. The practical result of England's aggressions in Venezuela is plain enough. They are all directed to securing the control of the Orinoco, the great river system of northern South America, and also of the rich mining district of

¹ *North American Review*, June, 1895, on which I have drawn for the foregoing narrative.

the Yuruari. All that England has done has been a direct violation of the Monroe Doctrine, and she has increased and quickened her aggressions in proportion as the United States have appeared indifferent. The time has come for decisive action. The United States must either maintain the Monroe Doctrine and treat its infringement as an act of hostility or abandon it. If Great Britain is to be permitted to occupy the ports of Nicaragua and still worse take the territory of Venezuela, there is nothing to prevent her taking the whole of Venezuela or any other South American state. If Great Britain can do this with impunity, France and Germany will do it also. These powers have already seized the islands of the Pacific and parcelled out Africa. Great Britain cannot extend her possessions in the East. She has pretty nearly reached the limit of what can be secured in Africa. She is now turning her attention to South America. If the United States are prepared to see South America pass gradually into the hands of Great Britain and other European powers and to be hemmed in by British naval posts and European dependencies, there is, of course, nothing more to be said. But the American people are not ready to abandon the Monroe Doctrine. . . . They are not now and never will be willing to have South America and the islands adjacent to the United States seized by European powers. . . . It is not too late to peacefully but firmly put an end to these territorial aggressions of Great Britain and to en-

force the Monroe Doctrine so that no other power will be disposed to infringe upon it. . . .

In the controversies over the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty and the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, Great Britain and the United States have acted virtually from the same principle or motive—the right or desire to protect their possessions; each nation was on the defensive, Great Britain with respect to India and the United States with respect to its own territory. In this Venezuela controversy the situation was essentially different. Great Britain was not simply protecting her actual interests, but was endeavoring to enlarge them, to increase her possessions in the Western Hemisphere; her attitude, ostensibly defensive, was fundamentally aggressive. Isthmian canal controversies may be considered as unavoidable; this boundary controversy was of Great Britain's deliberate seeking.

To prevent a settlement of it by the United States or a war with the United States, Great Britain agreed with Venezuela upon arbitration. Pursuant to a treaty between these powers concluded at Washington in 1907, a joint commission of arbitration was appointed with the following membership:

Baron Russell, Lord Chief Justice of England, nominated by members of the British Privy Council. . . .

Sir Richard Collins, Lord Justice of Appeals of Great Britain, nominated in like manner.

Chief Justice Fuller of the United States Supreme Court, nominated by President Andrade, of Venezuela.

Justice Brewer, of the United States Supreme Court, nominated by the three forementioned justices.

Frederic de Martens, Privy Councillor of Saint Petersburg, nominated by the four forementioned justices.

Mr. de Martens acted as chairman of the commission.

The impressions made by this commission upon the minds of foreign and presumably disinterested observers or reviewers of its proceedings may be judged from the following samples furnished by MM. Bariset and de La Chanoine of the French bar:

Article II of the Treaty of Washington had specified that the arbitrators should be "jurists," which, by implication, excluded diplomats. The intention was that they should act,

not as a commission of international policy, having for its object to reconcile as well as it could the conflicting prejudices of the opposing governments, by a solution which should give about equal weight to the interests of Great Britain and of Venezuela, but as judges forming a court. They were, therefore, to take a lawyer's point of view . . . to seek justice and not mutual concession. It was expected that their verdict would be a legal decision and not a political compromise. The arbitrators would not have been "jurists," if they were not to have been judges. Such at least were the hopes entertained by the contending parties, but particularly by the Venezuelans.¹

. . . The American judges observed an extreme reserve and neutrality; they preserved with scrupulous care their attitude of judges, and did not interrupt the discussion, except with requests for information to enlighten their consciences. The English judges, on the contrary, acted from the beginning to the end of the debates, not as judges but as officials committed in advance to the British claims. They practised neither circumspection nor neutrality, as clearly appears both in their system of intentional obstruction, consisting in tiring the attorneys of Venezuela in the course of the arguments with interminable successions of diffuse and ambiguous questions and in their favoring the at-

¹ *L'arbitrage anglo-venezuélien*, by G. Bariset.

torneys of Great Britain by means of leading questions¹ not improbably agreed upon in advance.² . . . While the two American arbitrators were more judges than attorneys, the two English arbitrators were more attorneys than judges. Lord Russell, notably, made himself conspicuous by the excessive frequency of his interruptions no less than by his *parti pris* against the arguments presented in favor of Venezuela.³

It was agreed in the Treaty of Washington that actual possession and effective colonization of any of the territory in dispute during a period of fifty years should be deemed to give title in such territory. Taking advantage of the point thus conceded to them, the British counsel based their argument chiefly on the plea of *uti possidetis*, actual possession. The result was naturally a sort of arbitral victory for Great Britain. The award gave back to Venezuela the rich mining territory of Yuruari, but left Great Britain in possession of vast tracts of territory to which she had never had any but a squatter's right.

¹ *Questions insidieuses.*

² *Une application du Principe de l'Arbitrage*, by L. de La Cha-noine. (*Revue d'Europe*, March, 1900, pp. 2, 19, 220.)

³ G. Bariset, *opus cit.*

. . . The territory in dispute was divided unequally, seventy-nine per cent being awarded to the English and twenty-one per cent to the Venezuelans. British Guiana tripled in area. It was until then the smallest of the three European Guianas; it became much the largest one. . . .

The line of extreme British claims was not proposed seriously; the government designedly asked for more than it wanted in order to obtain just what it wanted.

. . . The Venezuelan agent, Mr. J. M. de Rojas, declared that the sentence was laughable [*dérisoire*] and constituted "a manifest injustice." At Caracas, General Ignacio Andrade, President of the republic, stated in language less strong, though equivalent to it in substance, that "international justice had restored to the country some of the territories usurped" . . . the verdict was "essentially a compromise." Most of the English papers said so. Speaking for himself, Mr. de Martens declared that the arbitral frontier was "a line based upon justice and law." "The judges," he added, "were animated with the desire to establish a compromise." These words contradict themselves; for "a frontier of compromise" is not "a frontier of justice," as was very truly remarked by General Harrison and Mr. Mallet-Prévost, the counsel of Venezuela . . . the most equitable solution, to be sure, could not but be a compromise, but on condition that the compromise be an equitable one.¹

¹ G. Bariset, *opus cit.*

My compatriots who read from here on may wince at the remarks by which the writer of the foregoing strictures accounts in his way for the verdict rendered. When all allowance is made for possible misconceptions, there is something in his representations that every United States American may well take seriously to heart as a warning, if not as a reproach.

The arbitrators, the counsels, and even for a time the agents were all English or American. With the exception of the President [Russian, of German birth] the international tribunal of arbitration was exclusively Anglo-Saxon. . . . Since 1897, the date of the treaty, the world had moved. . . . Assured of the neutrality of Great Britain, the United States stripped Spain of her last remaining colonies. Assured of the neutrality of the United States, the English resolved to rob the Boers of their independence. When the proceedings in the case commenced, the Americans were entering in the Philippines upon a war as unjust as the war contemplated at that time by the English against the Dutch republics of South Africa. Yet in the tribunal itself the Americans represented the Venezuelans, heirs of the Spaniards, and the English founded their claims upon the rights of the Dutch, whom they had succeeded in Guiana. To pretend to decide a question in the name of right and justice, living at the end of the nine-

teenth century and being Anglo-Saxon, that is rather paradoxical; to take the attitude of adversary while proclaiming oneself brother, issued from one and the same race as one's adversary, that is still better; but to defend the rights of the very people whom one wrongs, that is simply perfect. . . . The North Americans were not less satisfied than the English. Arbitration once agreed to by England, and the Monroe Doctrine having thus triumphed, their lively interest in the cause of Venezuela subsided. A single question concerned them still—that of the control of the Orinoco, which they were bent on excluding England from; and it was settled in accordance with their wishes.¹

However much of the foregoing arraignment we may resent as unwarranted, let us not indulge ourselves in the conceit that we are proof against every temptation to practise the devious, grasping diplomacy which we condemn in Great Britain. Nations, like individuals, are subject to temptations which prove too strong for their sense of right. Our geographical position has saved us—it can hardly be said to do so now—from the need of oversea dominion. We cannot say what we should do under such temptation to freebooting as Great Britain has

¹ G. Bariset, *opus cit.*

been subjected to. We are too young a nation to be able to compare ourselves ethically with her; and we should candidly admit that our treatment of our Indians, if not "A Century of Dishonor," included much that was hardly honorable; and that such wrong as our intervention in the Panama Revolution would not have to be repeated very often to make a record that would be a shame to any people.

The forcible collection of a debt by one nation from another is an act of war, except where the debtor country is in a state of anarchy or in such disorder as to be incapable of waging war. In such case the collection involves taking possession of the country, giving it a government, and remaining in possession and control of it long enough to collect the debt, which brings us to a consideration of this question in the light of the Monroe Doctrine. In 1907 President Roosevelt said in a confidential message to the Senate:

An aggrieved nation can, without interfering with the Monroe Doctrine, take what action it sees fit in the adjustment of its dispute with American states, provided that action does not take the shape of interference with their form of

government or of the despoilment of their territory under any disguise. But, short of this, when the question is one of a money claim, the only way which remains, finally, to collect it is a blockade or bombardment or the seizure of the custom-houses; and this means, as has been said above, what is in effect a possession, even though only a temporary possession of territory. The United States then becomes a party in interest, because under the Monroe Doctrine it cannot see any European power seize and permanently occupy the territory of one of these republics; and yet such a seizure of territory, disguised or undisguised, may eventually offer the only way in which the power in question can collect any debts, unless there is interference on the part of the United States.

While not quite clear, the meaning seems to be that every occupation is to be prevented or discountenanced by the United States because it may develop into a permanent one, which would be a contravention of the Monroe Doctrine.

Following this line of policy, President Roosevelt, in 1907, ratified a convention which provided for the assistance of the United States in the collection of custom dues of the Dominican Republic and their application to the liquidation of a debt of about \$17,000,000. This may

prove to be a precedent for preventing foreign intervention, by an arrangement between the United States and the debtor nation providing for joint settlement of the debt. But there are precedents for a different course—for leaving the foreign power to collect its debt, on the assumption or its assurance that it will not offend against the Monroe Doctrine. When, in 1862, the joint French, British, and Spanish expedition was undertaken against Mexico, the purpose of it, so far as our government knew, was the collection of debts due largely as indemnity for violence committed against the legations of France and Great Britain. On the 23d of August, 1862, our secretary of state wrote to our minister in Paris:

This government, relying on the explanations which have been made by France, regards the conflict as a war involving claims by France which Mexico has failed to adjust to the satisfaction of her adversary, and it avoids intervention between the belligerents.

Not until it transpired that the purpose of the expedition included the subversion of the republican form of government in Mexico did our government commence to protest against it.

By this time Great Britain and Spain had withdrawn from the coalition, leaving us France alone to deal with.

In 1864 a conflict arose between Spain and Peru over an attack made on a settlement of Spanish subjects in Peru and old debts claimed by Spain. To bring the Peruvian Government to terms, a Spanish squadron seized the Chincha Islands off the coast of Peru, which at this time were still rich in guano deposits. In 1865 the Spanish naval forces proclaimed the coast of Chili under blockade, in retaliation for alleged infraction of neutrality on the part of Chili in favor of Peru. This brought Chili into the war as an ally of Peru. In 1866 the Republic of Ecuador, from a spirit of Pan American solidarity, allied itself with Chili and Peru against the common European enemy. This led to the bombardment of the unfortified place of Valparaiso, Chili, a purely commercial town of from 80,000 to 100,000 inhabitants, many of whom were citizens of the United States. The minister of the United States, Mr. Kilpatrick, expressed to the Spanish admiral, "in the name of his government, his most solemn protest against the act as unusual and unnecessary, and

in contravention of the laws and customs of civilized nations; reserving to his government the right to take such action as it may deem proper in the premises." But, apart from this ineffectual remonstrance, the United States did not attempt to interfere. Secretary Seward contented himself with writing to Mr. Kilpatrick (June 2, 1866):

. . . We maintain and insist, with all the decision and energy which are compatible with our existing neutrality, that the republican system which is accepted by any of those [Spanish-American] states shall not be wantonly assailed, and that it shall not be subverted as an end of a lawful war by European powers. . . . In such wars as are waged between nations which are in friendship with ourselves, if they are not pushed, like the French war in Mexico, to the political point before mentioned, we do not intervene. . . .¹

The Chincha Islands were retaken from Spain by a Peruvian force in 1865. It must be admitted that the value of this case and the foregoing one, as precedents for non-intervention by the United States, is somewhat impaired by the circumstances that both cases, like that of the British colonization of Belize, arose during our

¹ Seward to Kilpatrick, June 2, 1866.

Civil War, when the attention and resources of the government were concentrated upon the preservation of the Union.

In 1897 the unlawful imprisonment of a German subject in Hayti brought that republic into conflict with Germany. On the application of the German minister the prisoner was immediately released, but the Haytian Government hesitated to punish the responsible officials and to pay the damage called for. As a consequence, two German war vessels came into the harbor of Port-au-Prince, and their commander issued an ultimatum, giving the republic six hours in which to comply with the German demands; they were complied with.

In 1902 Great Britain, Germany, and Italy, to secure the payment of debts due to their subjects, united in seizing Venezuelan war vessels and in the bombardment of Venezuelan ports. These acts of war occasioned no remonstrance from the United States. But Doctor Drago, Minister of Foreign Relations of the Argentine Republic, expressed himself thereon to our government, through the Argentine minister at Washington, advancing for the first time the principle known as the Drago Doctrine:

The recovery *manu militari* of debts implies territorial occupation, which supposes the suppression or subordination of governments.

That situation openly contravenes the principles repeatedly proclaimed by the nations of America and particularly the Monroe Doctrine, so efficaciously asserted and defended on all occasions by the United States, to which doctrine the Argentine Republic has already implicitly adhered.

The principles enunciated in the memorable message of December 2, 1823, contain two grand declarations which have particular application to those republics:

"The American continents are not henceforth to be subject to future colonization by European nations, and the independence of the nations of America having been recognized, the intervention of a European power with the object of oppressing or of controlling their destinies in any way cannot be viewed but as the manifestation of sentiments unfriendly to the United States."

All that the Argentine Republic maintains and what it would like to see confirmed with regard to the occurrences in Venezuela, by a nation which like the United States enjoys such great authority and power, is the principle already accepted—that there can be no European expansion of territory in America, or oppression of the peoples of that continent, on account of an unfortunate financial situation that may have led one of them to postpone meeting its

obligations. In a word, the principle that it would like to see recognized is that a public debt cannot occasion armed intervention, still less material occupation of the soil of American nations, by a European power.¹

Had the distinguished writer, as he says, maintained only that there should be "no European expansion of territory in America or oppression of the peoples of that continent" on no matter what account, the United States would have agreed with him, giving, however, a different meaning to the word oppression from that which he gives it. But in his last sentence he maintains considerably more than this. However much the United States might disapprove of the forcible collection of debts, especially from an American republic, it could not consider such action as necessarily, nor in the case of Venezuela, an act of oppression of such country or even a remote danger to the government or institutions of the United States. It could not, therefore, accept the Drago Doctrine as a corollary of the Monroe Doctrine nor treat this case as a contravention of it.

When, in 1895, Great Britain levied a fine of

¹ Drago to Merou, December 29, 1902.

\$75,000 upon Nicaragua for an offence against her dignity and, on its not being paid, sent her war-ships to Corinto and took possession of the town, our government resisted the pressure of our people for intervention and left to the republics of Costa Rica, San Salvador, and Guatemala the subscription of a sufficient sum to liquidate the indebtedness.

On this subject of debts and the Monroe Doctrine, Mr. Bartholdt, of Missouri, said in the House of Representatives:

The Monroe Doctrine is not nearly as important to-day as it was even ten years ago, for the simple reason that at The Hague conference it was determined—all nations agreeing in that determination and it is now a part of the international law of the world—that contractual debts could no longer be collected by force, either in Central or South America. That takes out of the Western Hemisphere nearly every element of friction which has heretofore caused trouble, and, therefore, I say the Monroe Doctrine is not to-day as important as it was, and the European powers are ready to recognize it.

The Hague conference has not determined “that contractual debts could no longer be collected by force in either Central or South

America." That body is not competent to take such definitive action. It can only recommend to the nations rules or principles for their approval and ratification. Here is what The Hague conference did recommend regarding contract claims:

The contracting powers are agreed not to resort to armed force for the recovery of contract debts claimed from the government of one country by the government of another country as due to its nationals.

However, this stipulation will not apply when a debtor state refuses or leaves unanswered an offer to arbitrate or, in case of acceptance, renders the settlement of the special agreement impossible or, upon arbitration, fails to conform to the award. (*Article I of the convention of June 30, 1908, concerning the limitation of the use of force for the recovery of contract debts.*)¹

These provisions, be it observed, do not impose on the debtor nation any obligation to accept an offer of arbitration; they plainly recog-

¹ Les puissances contractantes sont convenues de ne pas avoir recours à la force armée pour le recouvrement de dettes contractuelles réclamées au gouvernement d'un pays par le gouvernement d'un autre pays comme dues à ses nationaux.

Toutefois cette stipulation ne pourra être appliquée quand l'état débiteur refuse ou laisse sans réponse une offre d'arbitrage ou, en cas d'acceptation, rend impossible l'établissement de compromis ou, après l'arbitrage, manque de se conformer à la sentence rendue.

nize his right to decline it and the possibility of his not even answering it. In either of these cases the creditor nation is allowed to proceed to collection by force. If all the nations of the world had, as Mr. Bartholdt intimates, ratified these provisions, there would still be considerable room for armed conflict over contract debts. But the nations have not all ratified them. On the 1st of October, 1912, the nations which had and those which had not were the following. The letter R indicates that the ratification was qualified by a reservation.¹

RATIFIED

Latin-American Nations

- | | |
|------------------|------------------|
| 1. Guatemala, R. | 4. Nicaragua, R. |
| 2. Hayti. | 5. Panama. |
| 3. Mexico. | 6. Salvador, R. |

Other Nations

- | | |
|--------------------|-----------------------|
| 1. Austro-Hungary. | 8. Netherlands. |
| 2. China. | 9. Norway. |
| 3. Denmark. | 10. Portugal. |
| 4. France. | 11. Roumania. |
| 5. Germany. | 12. Russia. |
| 6. Great Britain. | 13. United States, R. |
| 7. Japan. | |

¹ *Hague Convention Ratifications*, statement issued by World Peace Foundation, October 1, 1912; *Les Deux Conférences de la Paix*, 1899 et 1907; *Recueil général de Traités*, by Martens. I have considered adherence to the convention as equivalent to ratification.

NOT RATIFIED

Latin-American Nations

- | | |
|----------------|------------------------|
| 1. Argentina. | 8. Dominican Republic. |
| 2. Bolivia. | 9. Ecuador. |
| 3. Brazil. | 10. Honduras. |
| 4. Chili. | 11. Paraguay. |
| 5. Colombia. | 12. Peru. |
| 6. Costa Rica. | 13. Uruguay. |
| 7. Cuba. | 14. Venezuela. |

Other Nations

- | | |
|----------------|------------------|
| 1. Belgium. | 8. Servia. |
| 2. Bulgaria. | 9. Siam. |
| 3. Greece. | 10. Spain. |
| 4. Italy. | 11. Sweden. |
| 5. Luxemburg. | 12. Switzerland. |
| 6. Montenegro. | 13. Turkey. |
| 7. Persia. | |

Of the twenty nations of Latin-America, eighteen were represented at the conference. The two nations not represented were Costa Rica and Honduras. Of the twenty nations, three ratified the convention without reservation, fourteen did not ratify it, and three ratified it with a reservation which amounts almost to nullification.¹

¹ This reservation is expressed substantially as follows:

1. So far as debts resulting from ordinary contracts between the nationals of one country and the government of another are concerned, arbitration will not be resorted to except in the case of

The net result of it all is about this: that in the collection of certain kinds of contract debt a nation must make an offer of arbitration before resorting to force; that its resorting to force may be prevented by the acceptance of arbitration; and that about one in seven of the probable debtor nations has agreed to accept arbitration when it is not strong enough to prevent military occupation. If it accepts arbitration, it yields to threats of force; if it submits to occupation, it succumbs to acts of force. The settlement is thus a matter of battalions and battle-ships in either case. This arrangement, we are told, "takes out of the Western Hemisphere nearly every element of friction which has heretofore caused trouble." Far from it. The critical and delicate task of keeping on good terms with non-American powers which intervene in the affairs of our sister republics is still with us.

Whether it is safe for the United States to let their armed forces go into American countries depends upon their particular intentions and the

denial of justice by the judiciary of the country of the contract, the resources of which must first be exhausted.

2. Public loans with emission of bonds, constituting national debts, cannot in any case give cause for military aggression or for material occupation of the soil of American nations.

ability of the United States to evict them should they attempt unduly to prolong their stay. It is thus a diplomatic and military question, to which there can be no general answer. It can only be properly answered for each case as it arises. So far as it is answerable in the affirmative, the United States should let foreign nations settle their differences with American nations directly.

The Drago Doctrine is a corollary not of the Monroe Doctrine but of the Bolivar Idea. As such it deserves, and will doubtless receive, the serious consideration of Pan American statesmen.

IV

THE BOLIVAR IDEA. CONCLUSION

As the countries of the Old World become more and more crowded, the need of territory in which their surplus population may establish and perpetuate itself under the flag of the mother country becomes correspondingly greater and the demand for colonies grows louder and more insistent. Those lands should be looked for, says the Bolivar Idea, in the Old World and not in the New. But they will probably be sought, strenuously and forcibly, along the lines of least resistance, wherever they may lie.

Considering the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine to Germany, the almost complete partition of Africa among six European powers, the spoliation of Central America and Venezuela by Great Britain, the annexation of Corea to Japan, of Madagascar and Morocco to France, of parts of China to Germany, Russia, and Japan, of Tripoli to Italy, and the acquisition of

the Panama Canal Zone by the United States—all since the Franco-German War—one cannot shut one's eyes to the fact that territory is still, in the minds of statesmen, a prize to be fought or bartered for—to be acquired without too scrupulous a regard to means whenever the opportunity offers.

It is apprehended that Germany and perhaps Italy and other nations having settlers in South America are coveting territory in that region. There are indications that the policies of those countries are purely commercial, aiming only at the creation and maintenance of markets for the mother country; that there is no danger of any attempt to acquire territory so long, at least, as the policies mentioned are not seriously thwarted. This may be true, but who knows how far it may be due to the lack of military and naval means to carry out a policy of conquest and annexation, and when such means may become available? Policies change, and true statesmanship regards not only what has been and what is, but also what may be.

The Monroe Doctrine, construed as Monroe meant it to be, so as to cover the whole Western Hemisphere, goes far toward answering the purpose of Pan Americanism. But there is a con-

siderable and ever-increasing difference between the protection that can be afforded to the American world by the United States alone and that which might be afforded it by the united efforts of all American nations, actuated by a spirit not merely of national but of continental, of Pan American, solidarity. Bolivar's active interest and efforts did not go beyond a union of the nations of Spanish origin, and even in this he was to be bitterly disappointed. As to a concert of all American nations, he indulged in dreams and speculations which led him occasionally to express himself as if he seriously contemplated the union of all American states in some sort of league or confederacy. Two instances of his doing so may be cited:

Would that some day we might be fortunate enough to establish there [at Panama] an august congress of the representatives of the republics, kingdoms, and empires [of America], to deal with the high interests of peace and of war with the nations of the other three parts of the world.¹

. . . I venture to flatter myself that the ardent desire which animates all Americans of exalting the power of the world of Columbus will

¹Translation, letter to a Jamaican, Sept. 6, 1815. *Documentos para la Historia del Libertador*, edited under direction of Guzman Blanco, V, 340.

moderate the difficulties and delays incidental to ministerial preparations. . . .

The day on which our plenipotentiaries exchange their powers an immortal epoch will be fixed in the diplomatic history of America. When, after a hundred centuries, posterity shall seek the origin of our public law, and record the pacts which determined its history, it will register with respect the protocols of the Isthmus of Panama. In them they will find the plan of the first alliances, which will indicate the course of our relationship with the rest of the universe. What then will be the Isthmus of Corinth to the Isthmus of Panama?¹

The Isthmus of Corinth, being a central position with reference to northern and southern Greece, was often chosen as the site of a Pan Hellenic Congress. Panama appeared to Bolivar as a great international emporium. "Its canals," he said, "will shorten the routes of the world; will strengthen the conventional bonds between Europe, America, and Asia; will bring to that favored region the tributes of the several quarters of the globe. Perhaps there only will it be possible to fix the capital of the world, as Constantine considered Byzantium the capital of the Ancient World."²

¹ Translation, circular convening Congress of Panama, December 7, 1824, *opus cit.*, Guzman Blanco, IX, 448.

² Translation, letter to a Jamaican, *opus cit.*, Guzman Blanco, V, 339.

But the context, his language on other occasions, and other testimony indicate that he never thought of an all-American union as practicable. After the failure of the first Pan American Congress, he wrote: "The Congress of Panama, which would have been admirable if it had been more efficacious, makes me think of that Greek madman, who, from the summit of a rock, pretended to direct the movements of vessels on the high sea. The power of the congress will be chimerical. Its decrees can be but counsels, nothing more. People write to me that many dreamers desire a code with a penal constitution. What code? What is the political organization that will produce harmony? All that is ideal and absurd."¹ It appears that he expected to unite the Latin-American republics in an association somewhat closer than the Holy Alliance and yet not so close as a confederacy, to found a sort of amphictyonic council, or assembly of plenipotentiaries, which should discuss and promote the interests which the states had in common, provide for their common defence, and settle their differences by arbitration backed by military force.

This union of Latin-American countries was

¹ Translation, letter to Guzman, August 8, 1826.

to be under the hegemony of Colombia.¹ The circular in which Bolivar invited the governments of Colombia, Mexico, Central America, the United Provinces of Buenos Ayres, Chili, and Brazil to send delegates to the Congress of Panama gave no indication that the United States was to be represented at that meeting.² The invitation received by the United States was extended to it at a late date by the governments of the forementioned countries.³ While not what is now understood by Pan Americanism, Bolivar's purpose was the germ of that sentiment, the origin of that principle, and seems to warrant its being called after him—the Bolivar Idea.

The Pan American Association, formed at the instance of the United States, was called first *The Commercial Bureau of the American Republics*, then *The International Bureau of American Republics*, and is now called *The Pan American Union*. These changes of name are significant of the broadening scope and purpose of the institution. It is maintained by the twenty-one American republics and devoted to "the development and conservation of commerce, friendly

¹ *El Ideal internacional de Bolivar*, F. J. Urrutia, p. 27.

² *Sen. Ex. Doc. 232, Part 4*, pp. 155, 156. ³ *Ibid.*, pp. 74, 76.

intercourse, and good understanding among all the American republics.”¹ Its management is determined by a governing board consisting of the secretary of state of the United States, who is *ex-officio* chairman, and the diplomatic representatives of all the governments represented in the bureau and accredited to the government of the United States. It is located in Washington because that city is the only one at which all the American republics have diplomatic representatives. Its executive officers are a director-general and assistant director, elected by the governing board. Under the auspices of the union there have been four Pan American conferences: one in Washington in 1889, one in Mexico in the winter of 1901-2, one in Rio de Janeiro in 1906, and one in Buenos Ayres in 1910. The change of name from congress to conference may be explained by the enlargement of the scope of the meetings to include many subjects not of political character and to provide for discussing and agreeing without any view to negotiation. The history of the Pan American movement may thus be divided into two periods—one of congresses, beginning with the Congress of Panama in 1826 and ending with that of Lima

¹ *The Pan American Union*, by John Barrett, p. 60.

in 1865, and one of conferences, beginning with the Washington Conference of 1889 and, let us hope, never to end. In the proceedings of the first period the United States took little or no part; in those of the second it has taken a prominent, if not a leading, one. During the first period ambitious plans for political union were discussed and approved, but generally failed of ratification; during the second period less has been attempted and perhaps more accomplished. But the results cannot be determined with accuracy and are easily exaggerated. A great showing is made by stringing out the resolutions, conventions, treaties, etc., that are passed; the unwary public is thus led to believe that these more or less admirable measures are made law or usage. They are only recommendations until formally ratified by their respective governments. Which of them are ratified and which are not? Which of those that are ratified are observed and which are a dead letter? On such vital questions, the publications of peace societies and of the Pan American Union leave us lamentably in the dark. With the light that I have been able to get from these organizations and from the Department of State, I have pre-

pared the following statement of the more important measures enacted at the principal congresses and conferences, with the corresponding ratifications. It is far from perfect or complete, but it is presented as the best available one and an important part of this discussion.

PRINCIPAL SESSIONS OF PAN AMERICAN CONGRESSES AND CONFERENCES

CONGRESSES

No.	Place	Date	States represented	More important enactments	Ratified or adhered to, by
1.	Panama.	22 June to 15 July, 1826.	Colombia, Cent. America, Mexico, Peru.	1. League of Perpetual Union and Confederation.	Colombia (ratified in part).
2.	Lima.	11 Dec., 1847, to 1 March, 1848.	Bolivia, Chili, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru	2. Treaty of Confederation, 3. Treaty of Commerce, 4. Consular Convention, 5. Postal Convention.	Colombia.
3.	Santiago.	15 Sept., 1856.	Chili, Ecuador, Peru.	6. League and Confederation called "The Continental Treaty."	Bolivia, Chili, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Salvador.
4.	Lima.	14 Nov., 1864, to 23 Jan., 1865.	Argentina, Bolivia, Chili, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Peru, Salvador, Venezuela.	7. Treaty of Union and Alliance, 8. Treaty for Maintenance of Peace.	

PRINCIPAL SESSIONS OF PAN AMERICAN CON-
GRESSES AND CONFERENCES—(CONTINUED)
CONFERENCES

No.	Place	Date	States represented	More important enactments	Ratified or adhered to, by
5.	Washington.	2 Oct., 1889, to 19 Apr., 1890.	All, except Santo Domingo.	9. Treaty for Compulsory Arbitration.	Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Peru, Salvador, Santo Domingo, Uruguay.
6.	Mexico.	22 Oct., 1901, to 31 Jan., 1902.	All.	10. Treaty for Compulsory Arbitration,	
				11. Treaty for Arbitration of pecuniary claims, 12. Convention for the codification of American International Law.	
7.	Rio de Janeiro.	23 July to 27 Aug., 1906.	All, except Hayti and Venezuela.	13. Convention for the Codification of American International Law, 14. Convention as to status of naturalized citizens, 15. Convention for the protection of Copyrights, Patents, and Trade Marks, 16. Treaty for Arbitration of Pecuniary Claims.	U. S. and seven other states (1909).
				17. Convention for the Protection of Copyrights, 18. Convention for the Protection of Patents, 19. Convention for the Protection of Trade Marks and Commercial Names, 20. Treaty for the Arbitration of Pecuniary Claims.	U. S. and thirteen other states (1912).
8.	Buenos Ayres.	12 July to 30 Aug., 1910.	All, except Bolivia.		U. S. and twelve other states (1913).
					Chili, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Salvador (1910).
					U. S. and eleven other states (1913).

These twenty compacts may be classified according to subjects and to ratification, as follows:

SUBJECTS

Confederation, Peace, and Arbitration.....	10
Trade and Commerce.....	7
International Law.....	3

RATIFICATION

By United States and other states.....	4
By other states only.....	5
Not ratified at all.....	11

While less visionary or more practical than the congresses, the conferences can hardly be said to have returned in useful achievement the time, money, and labor that they have cost. Their treaties for compulsory arbitration have not been ratified by half of the Latin-American states nor by the United States and, should they be ratified, are doomed to violation. The conferences have committed American countries to undertaking the construction of a grand Pan American railroad which may prove to be impracticable and seems of doubtful utility.

If the railroad were built, under present conditions, it would not pay for its axle-grease. There would not be one passenger in a year

who would buy a through ticket. The journey by rail would be wholly intolerable not alone on account of the distance but because of the great stretches of high plateaux with their heat and dust. The journey from New York to Buenos Ayres would be made in half the time on a good ship and with infinitely greater pleasure. So far as through freight is concerned, it is preposterous to discuss the subject. Coal can be carried from New York to Buenos Ayres by ship for five dollars or six dollars a ton; it could not be carried by rail, if such railroad were in existence, for less than thirty dollars or forty dollars a ton. In such visionary, chimerical dreams as this do Pan American conferences find their strongest and most wholesome inspiration.¹

With a view to the unification of American currency, weights, and measures, of censuses, and of statistical nomenclature, there has been some discussing and resolving, but nothing, it would seem, in the form of a treaty or convention. The conferences have applied themselves chiefly to the assurance of peace. They have promoted mutual understanding and good will by the encouragement of trade and commerce and other forms of international intercourse. It is true that the ten republics of South America furnish the United States less

¹ *American Supremacy*, by G. W. Crichfield, II, 431.

than one-quarter of their exports and receive from it only about a seventh of their imports, but the ten northern republics (Mexico, Guatemala, Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Hayti) give nearly three-quarters of their exports to the United States and receive from it more than half of their imports.¹ The share of the United States in the trade of Latin-America, while not equal to that of Europe, is greater than that of any other country. In 1911 Latin-America's foreign trade (value of exports and imports) was partitioned as follows:

To the United States.....	28.98 per cent.
To Great Britain.....	23.24 per cent.
To Germany.....	14.65 per cent.
To France.....	8.63 per cent.
To other countries.....	24.50 per cent.
	100.00 per cent. ²

What is more important, our trade with Latin-America is increasing; and our and Latin-America's trade with the rest of the world is increasing even more rapidly than our trade with Latin-America.³

¹ *Bulletin of Pan American Union*, February, 1913.

² *Bulletin of Pan American Union*, February, 1913, p. 240.

³ Appendix C.

These conditions are attributable to the better understanding among American countries effected by Pan American conferences—not wholly, but in sufficient measure to augur well for the future usefulness of those meetings. May the time come when they will deal with the two fundamental problems of Latin-America—immigration and education—and by the solution of them repeople America, drawing to it the surplus brain and brawn of the world and endowing it with an art and literature fraught with new joys and inspirations for mankind. As the states of Latin-America rise to the performance of their appropriate parts in this achievement the United States will give them more and more consideration as political partners, the Monroe Doctrine will be less invoked, and the Bolivar Idea will come to express, not merely the vision of an American patriot, but the real, the successful, policy of America.

CONCLUSION

Pan American consciousness is a product of common occupancy of the Western Hemisphere, common European origin, common republican form, or ideals, of government. It corresponds

essentially to European, or Old World, consciousness. This American spirit is about to be powerfully stimulated by two new factors: the opening of the Panama Canal and the return of the United States to a policy of low tariff on imports. The commercial effect of these changes will be followed by social and political effects of even greater importance, the most notable of which will be a new Pan American solidarity. It is no use to decry such continental or hemisphere spirit as provincial or opposed to world unity. As well find fault with the division of the world into hemispheres. This geographical condition is not more beyond the power of man to make or unmake than is the spirit that is born of it and nourished by it. We could not abolish it, and why should we want to? Its two forms, Eastern and Western, differ, but need not conflict; they are complementary rather than antagonistic. The Western spirit craves the culture of the Eastern; but it wants the privilege of helping itself to it; the New World wants much of the civilization of the Old, but does not want any forced upon it.

Wise and efficient statesmanship may make America as populous as the rest of the world

and thus remove one excuse that nations of the Old World might advance for its conquest and annexation. Underpopulated sections of it may become exposed to incorporation in a non-American country, if not previously merged in a populous American one. The policy of population should be accompanied by a liberal open-door, commercial policy, which would give the Old World about all that it could get in the way of trade from colonies, and at less cost. Finally, population and trade, doing what they can to strengthen the New World and conciliate the Old, an enlightened military and naval policy might prove an effective complement to the system.

Toward one another, perhaps, more than toward European nations, the nations of America should cultivate the most cordial friendly relations. This applies especially to the United States, which, as the strongest, is the most liable to suspicion and distrust. It should go to the extreme of forbearance to avoid conflict with a sister American republic and lose no opportunity of removing any unfriendly feeling which such country may on any account be harboring against it. It should consider, too, that the Pan American solidarity, which it favors and

fosters as a protection against the rest of the world, is as resentful of American-born as it is of foreign-born injury; that in dealing with the feeblest American republic it has to do with all America, with an aggregation of over 70,000,000 fellow American citizens.

The opposition in America to certain features of European statecraft is diminishing as those features themselves disappear from the European system.

What Americans regard as the "European peril," against which the United States directed the Monroe Doctrine, the Latin states their past attempts at federation and open indorsement of the Monroe Doctrine; and against which they direct their present efforts for the development and institution of an American international law—this danger is nowhere so ardently combated as in Europe itself. Only in Europe it has a different name. The American people sought to protect themselves against that system of force, of intervention, of rank, of egotistic expansion, of dynastic interest and diplomatic ambition against which really cultivated Europe has been striving since the days of the French Revolution to protect itself and the struggles of which fill the history of the last one hundred and twenty years. What America is trying to protect itself against is just what

European democracy is by bitter, desperate strife struggling to free itself from. . . . Europe, as here defined, and modern Pan America have a common opponent—feudalism, which, since the Middle Ages, has often changed its form but never its essential spirit.¹

Pan Americanism does not involve a secession or divorce of the Western Hemisphere from the Eastern. In the domain of so-called international law it implies not independence but autonomy; it contemplates American regulation of affairs peculiar to America or that concern America more than they concern any other part of the world—with due regard to those general rules that are necessary to harmony in the family of nations. It does not, as already intimated, exclude non-American immigration, or non-American capital, or even non-American political influence. It admits of occasional co-operation of European with American powers, but draws the line at non-American dictation or supremacy, at the determination of the destiny of an American power by any non-American power or powers. It is not opposed to the unification of the world, but it is to its Europeanization. It means that American nations

¹ *Pan-Amerika*, by A. H. Fried, *opus cit.*, pp. 290, 291.

shall be as independent of the European concert as the European concert is of American nations; that the American hemisphere, though smaller in area and in population than the European, shall be politically the equal of it.

Whatever the efforts and the talents that may be applied to its development, America, comprising less than one-quarter of the land surface of the globe and less to-day than one-tenth of its population, will in all probability never be able to defend itself as a sparsely populated region against the rest of the world as an overpopulated one. The twenty armies of Latin-America aggregate on a war footing about one and a half million men.¹ Taking the army of the United States, including militia and volunteers, as two million, we get three and a half million as the total of the American military coalition. This force, hardly capable of united action, is less than the war army of any one of the three leading military powers of Europe—France, Germany, Russia.

Africa is already, and is likely to remain, under the dominion of Europe, especially of Great Britain, who has been the most earnest and

¹ A. Hartleben, *opus cit.*, compiled.

active opponent of Pan Americanism. Australia and Canada may possibly detach themselves from her and furnish some, but inadequate, support to America. Asia is in part European, but is waking up to resistance against its Europeanization. There is where America must look for its greatest sympathy and most effective co-operation in opposing Old World domination of the New. Since the earliest days of the republic there has been in the United States, if not a party, an element of population, which regards Great Britain as the natural friend and ally of the United States. Community of language makes a strong bond of union between a mother country and its progeny, be the latter dependent or independent. By the language of Shakespeare, of Cervantes, and of Camoens, the people of North America and of Central and South America are forever affiliated to those of Great Britain, of Spain, and of Portugal, but that relationship is, and should be, intellectual, not political. It has nothing to do with imperial greatness. There is no indication that Latin-Americans are less proud of the history and traditions of Castile for its being no longer the metropolis of a colonial world;

nor would people of the United States take less pride in their heritage from old England should not a British drum be heard outside of the British Islands. British dominion in India and in Africa is not necessary to American regard and affection for the mother country. It is, if anything, a damper to those feelings.

We should be on our guard against appeals to Anglo-Saxon loyalty, the standard euphemism for Anglomania—such as the following:

If British power prove insufficient to protect the empire, the unity of the Anglo-Saxons may be broken up and the great race, which united should be able to make "liberty and freedom within the law" the ultimate ruling principle of humanity, may be scattered into a number of small and weak and consequently uninfluential states. . . .

The present division of the Anglo-Saxon race is due merely to an old family quarrel, followed by a few minor disputes and dissensions. . . . We may well look forward in the far future to a gigantic peace-compelling Anglo-Saxon federation of all the Anglo-speaking peoples, with home rule all around and a great federal customs and defence union. Then will the Anglo-Saxon race be truly unassailable.¹

¹ *The Future Peace of the Anglo-Saxons*, by S. L. Murray, pp. 122, 123.

A specious proposal that the United States renounce the Washington Precept and the Bolivar Idea. What the United States would gain by it is hard to see. United America, not Greater Britain, is the aim of American statesmanship. The nations of America have no such interest in their mother countries as would justify them in cultivating their good will in general opposition to other nations. The United States owes to its British antecedents the foundations of its government, the beginnings and grandest inspirations of its literature, but in imperial administration it is shunning rather than following the example of Great Britain. In the domains of art, of science, of industry, of war, of education, it is less beholden to Great Britain than it is to Germany. To those who look a little below the fortuitous condition of a common language and origin; who consider the acts of nations and ponder on their motives and interests; who, looking over the past, note the injuries and the benefits received from foreign governments and peoples, the best friend of the United States appears to be Germany. But those who look away from the past and beyond the present, whose vision ranges toward

the purple rim of futurity, who contemplate a possible world conflict, between Old and New, between Tradition and Progress, descry a stocky, military figure silhouetted against the rising sun, embodying the spirit of the New East and representing the Great Britain of the Pacific. Japan, however, is not alone in the field for the mastery of the Orient. Russia may secure it and, if she do not, may, with her hundreds of millions of subjects, hold the balance of power between America and Europe. The most important friendship for Pan America to cultivate is that of Japan and Russia. It should seek to attach those powers to it and to reconcile them to each other. Befriended by these powerful empires and the lusty republic of China, Pan America may proceed down the vista of the ages, decking it with the trophies of peace, with prizes of art, of science, and of commerce, justifying the primitive meaning of the name Pacific Ocean and holding out as fair a promise as any yet given to men, of a Pacific World.

THE END

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF LATIN-AMERICAN COUNTRIES, IN CERTAIN COUNTRIES OF CONTINENT- AL EUROPE, IN THE COURSE OF THE WINTER OF 1900-1901.¹

Countries	United States	Latin-American
France.....	6,155	10,017
Germany.....	17,848	2,812
Italy.....	2,907	1,638
Spain.....	438	1,972
Portugal.....	646	7,675
Sweden.....	422	11
Luxemburg.....	18	8
Norway.....	3,648	81
Totals.....	32,082	24,214

For Germany, on the 1st of December, 1910, the numbers are:

United States.....	17,512
Latin-Americans.....	4,890

¹ Except those in France, the census of which was taken on the 24th of March, 1901.

but for Berlin:

United States.....	702
Latin-Americans.....	808

and for Paris (March 24, 1901):¹

United States.....	3,665
Latin-Americans.....	4,892

¹ *Résultats Statistiques du Recensement général de la Population* (1901), Tome IV.

APPENDIX B

MARRIAGES OF ARGENTINIANS IN BUENOS AYRES DURING THE YEAR 1907-8

Argentinians with Argentinians.....		4,565
Argentinian women with Italian men....	2,270	
Argentinian men with Italian women....	554	
		2,824
Argentinian women with Spanish men...	936	
Argentinian men with Spanish women...	404	
		1,340
Argentinian women with Uruguayan men	421	
Argentinian men with Uruguayan women	240	
		661
Argentinian women with French men....	178	
Argentinian men with French women...	99	
		277
Argentinian women with English men...	74	
Argentinian men with English women...	19	
		93
Argentinian women with German men...	51	
Argentinian men with German women...	21	
		72
Argentinian women with other men	208	
Argentinian men with other women	99	
		307
Total		10,139

La España Moderna, April, 1913, p. 153.

Deducting the undetermined 307, we have 9,832 marriages, of which 165 were Argentinian-English or Argentinian-German, and 9,667 that may be considered as Argentinian-Latin, Argentinian-mestizo, or Argentinian-Indian.

APPENDIX C

These tables are compiled and computed from Table No. 245, *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1912, p. 429, and other data furnished by the Department of Commerce. Unfortunately, no figures were available for the trade in general of Latin-America, subsequently to 1911.

I

TRADE OF UNITED STATES—EXPORTS AND IMPORTS

Year	With Latin-America	With all countries, including Latin-America	Ratio of trade with Latin-America to trade with all countries
1905	\$507,000,000	\$2,636,074,737	0.19
1911	681,000,000	3,577,546,304	0.19
	Increase, 34%	Increase, 36%	
	Per year, 5.7%	Per year, 6%	

2

TRADE OF LATIN-AMERICA—EXPORTS AND IMPORTS

Year	With United States	With all countries, including United States	Ratio of trade with U. S. to trade with all countries
1905	\$507,000,000	\$1,776,516,000	0.29
1911	681,000,000	2,457,676,000	0.28
	Increase, 34%	Increase, 38%	
	Per year, 5.7%	Per year, 6.3%	

3

TRADE OF UNITED STATES AND LATIN-AMERICA—EXPORTS AND IMPORTS

Year	With each other 2	With the rest of the world, jointly 3	Total 4	Ratio of trade with each other (Col. 2)	
				To trade with the rest of the world (Col. 3) 5	To total trade (Col. 4) 6
1905.....	\$507,000,000	\$3,398,590,737	\$3,905,000,000	0.15	0.12
1911.....	681,000,000	6,035,222,304	6,716,222,304	0.11	0.10
	Increase, 34 % Per year, 5.7 %	Increase, 77 % Per year, 13 %	Increase, 72 % Per year, 12 %		

4

TRADE OF UNITED STATES—EXPORTS AND IMPORTS

Year 1	With Latin-America 2	With the rest of the world 3	Total 4	Ratio of trade with Latin-America (Col. 2)	
				To trade with the rest of the world (Col. 3) 5	To total trade (Col. 4) 6
1911	\$645,000,000	\$2,932,546,304	\$3,577,546,304	0.22	0.18
1913	763,000,000	3,515,862,383	4,278,862,383	0.22	0.18
	Increase, 14 % Per year, 7 %	Increase, 20 % Per year, 10 %	Increase, 20 % Per year, 10 %		

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